TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DUE PROCESS
ASPIRATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Gregory S. Gordon*
“Perfection is impossible; like other human institutions criminal
proceedings must be a compromise.”
Judge Learned Hand1
“It is by compromise that human rights have been abandoned.”
Senator Charles Sumner2
I.

INTRODUCTION

The breathtaking growth of international criminal law over the past decade has
resulted in the prosecution of Balkan and Rwandan mass murderers, the development of a
substantial body of atrocity law jurisprudence and the creation of a permanent
International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. The growth of international criminal procedure, unfortunately, has not
kept pace. Among its shortcomings, critics have pointed to lengthy pre-trial detention
without a real possibility of provisional release, the use of affidavits and transcripts
instead of live witnesses at trial, the absence of juries, and the right of prosecutorial
appeal. Given the substantive law advances, why is international criminal procedure
lagging behind? Why has it failed to achieve the level of due process offered by the most
rights-protective countries, such as the United States? Are there long-term structural
limits to the growth of international criminal procedure? Neither the framers of the new
international tribunals nor the academic commentators have attempted to answer these
questions in a systematic or comprehensive way.
This Article will attempt to do so. It begins with the premise that, in the fertile
human rights soil of international criminal law,3 a procedural scheme nourished on
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Since they are meant to redress grave violations of human rights, the “extension to international
criminal proceedings of international human rights provisions of due process,” SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ,

fundamental notions of due process has at least taken root.4 Its growth has been slow but
steady. From the bare-bones privileges afforded defendants at the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, to the more fleshed-out protections of the ad hoc Yugoslav and
Rwanda tribunals, to the recent refinements of the International Criminal Court, the rights
of the accused in the international criminal dock have most certainly expanded.5 As
noted above, however, they have only gone so far.6
To understand why, it is instructive to consider the criminal procedure framework
of sovereign countries, such as the United States. These entities possess legal and
physical characteristics conducive to relatively uniform and effective enforcement of a
criminal defendant’s due process rights. For example, nation-states rely on their own
internal enforcement mechanisms to insure compliance with policy directives and rules.7
The latter, for their part, are established pursuant to the overarching norms of a
homogenous legal paradigm (for example, a common law adversarial system or a civil
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 7 (2003), can be seen as a logical and
salutary result. In addition to lending the proceedings moral and institutional coherence, such an extension
helps spare war-torn populations the ordeal of domestic criminal justice wielded as an instrument of
vengeance. Id. at 6. At the same time, respect for due process may serve as a model and inspiration for
those populations as they attempt, in the aftermath of international criminal prosecution, to reconstruct
what is left of their own ravaged justice infrastructure. See Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities:
A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59-AUT LCPR 127, 147
(1996). With respect to States, whose cooperation is essential to the success of international tribunals, the
due process regime permits them to execute the requests of the tribunals while complying with their own
internally and externally imposed human rights obligations. Zappalà, supra, at 6.
4
See generally Christian Defrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure
Matters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2001). See also Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Proceedings and the
Protection of Human Rights, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 935, 936 (2003) (“Human rights ‘enter’ the legal
framework of the Tribunals in a number of ways. The most direct application of human rights law
constitutes the rights explicitly set out in the Statutes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”).
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See Defrancia, supra note 4, at 1381. See also Michele Caianiello & Giulio Illuminati, From the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Court, 26 N.C.J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 407 (2001); Patricia M. Wald, Trying War Crimes in International Courts, 31 INT’L
J. LEGAL INFO. 278 (2003) (noting that the recent ICC rules of procedure represent a “significant
improvement” over its predecessors).
6
The criminal procedure problems identified above -- lengthy pre-trial detention without a real
possibility of provisional release, the use of affidavits and transcripts instead of live witnesses at trial, the
absence of juries, and the right of prosecutorial appeal -- as well as others identified infra, are not explicitly
enjoined by “international due process,” an accretion of norms derived from international and regional
treaties as well as the jurisprudence of international courts. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 586-87 (2003). In a magisterial undertaking, Professor Bassiouni has set
out these individual norms and their sources. Id. at 591-626. Although these norms “reflect the
adversary/accusatorial model of criminal justice,” id., and represent significant progress in the evolution of
international due process, they do not reach the level of protection found in the most rights-protective
systems, such as the United States. See Shane B. Kelbley, Reason Without Borders: How Transnational
Values Cannot Be Contained, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1595, 1628 (2005) (“[With respect to criminal
procedure] the United States is . . . one of the most rights-protective Nations in the world.”). The advanced
protections in those systems, particularly the United States, will be the normative point of repair for this
Article. They will serve as a conceptual reference to illustrate why the growth of international due process
has been cabined by the peculiar characteristics of international criminal adjudication.
7
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Statute, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 164, 181 (2000).
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law inquisitorial tradition).8 And while these entities deal with prosecuting large-scale,
serious crimes, they are rarely, if ever, called upon to confront the kind of widespread
mass murder and extreme violence that rises to the level of genocide, crimes against
humanity or war crimes.
International criminal tribunals and courts are not so fortunate.9 For the most
part, they depend on external agents (i.e., States) to search for and collect evidence,
apprehend suspects, and surrender them to the tribunals.10 There is only so much control
they can wield over States in this regard. In some cases, where tribunal and State might
otherwise be in accord, national security concerns may hinder State cooperation.11
Moreover, even if tribunals were self-sufficient with respect to enforcement, they are
forced to compromise internally regarding procedural matters. This is so because each
international tribunal must harmonize the imperatives of two different, often conflicting
legal systems – the common law and the civil law.12 Certain due process rights are
unfortunately sacrificed on the altar of this artificial union.13 Finally, international
criminal tribunals are not established to handle garden-variety crime. To the contrary,
they exist to prosecute the most heinous crimes ever committed – genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes.14 When weighed against the gravity of these horrific
offenses, the otherwise compelling mandate to enforce criminal procedure protections
may lose some of its urgency.
In the context of these considerations, this Article will attempt a comprehensive,
structural explanation of the competing forces at work behind the development of due
8

See id.
See Bassiouni, supra note 6, at 589 (“International adjudication also presents unique problems that
are unknown to national legal systems in that the former relies on the voluntary cooperation of states, while
the latter benefits from the vertical authoritative process that exists in domestic legal orders.”).
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See GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION AND THE COLLECTION OF
EVIDENCE: OBLIGATION OF STATES 6-7 (2002).
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See generally HERWIG ROGGEMANN & PETAR ŠARVEVIW, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2002).
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See Christoph Safferling, TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-2 (2001) (referring
to the “wide gap between the Anglo-American and the Continental traditions of criminal procedure.”).
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See Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 840,
868 (2002) (“Although each of these systems [the common law and the civil law] works well enough in its
own context, and on its own terms, they do not mix well together.”); Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace
by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Importance of Considering Discrepancies between the Civil and
Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the International Criminal Court, 6 UCLA INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 391 (2002) (The distinction is especially apparent when civil and common law traditions are
contrasted because “between [those] two systems, cultural, economic, and political factors have created
individuals with attitudes and very distinct points of view about the legal norms that should regulate our
conduct.”).
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See GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
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September Eleventh: The Case for a New Law to Regulate the Activities of American Corporations Abroad,
20 ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 607, 636 (2003) (“The ICC has jurisdiction over the world’s criminals that
commit the most heinous of crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”).
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process in international criminal procedure.15 On one hand, Part II will trace the growth
of international criminal procedure from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court.
It will show that the advances in extending due process protections parallel the growth of
human rights law globally and, to a certain extent, criminal procedure in the United
States. On the other hand, Part III will explore the forces checking the due process
expansion of international criminal procedure. It will focus on three separate phenomena
as contributing to this restriction: (1) fragmentation of enforcement; (2) integration of
conflicting legal systems; and (3) gravity of the crimes involved. The interaction of these
three restricting phenomena will then be analyzed. Finally, Part IV will examine the
impact these forces may have on the future development of due process in international
criminal procedure. In the end, the Article will conclude that any future growth of due
process will hinge on efforts to achieve greater degrees of structural globalization,
procedural hybridization, and transnational public awareness.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
A.

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg

The genesis of modern international criminal justice traces back to the end of
World War II with the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg16 (“IMT”).17 After the Allied victory in 1945, France, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and the Soviet Union met in London and established an agreement
(commonly referred to as the “London Agreement”) for the creation of the IMT.18 On
15

In general, experts have classified justice systems into three separate categories: domestic legal
justice, international criminal justice, and “hybrid” criminal justice, a term used to describe newly emerging
forms of mixed national-international criminal adjudication as found in, for example, the Sierra Leone and
proposed Cambodia tribunals. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 455-56
(2003). As specific domestic structures are grafted onto “hybrid” criminal procedure, Cassese, id. at 45657, this Article will not include analysis of them within its scope. For purposes of this Article, the term
“international criminal procedure” is meant to encompass the rules developed by the following truly
international courts (i.e., in addition to having multinational traits, not being moored to one specific
domestic tradition): the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (and, given its great similarity to the
Nuremberg Tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo), the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia , the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the
International Criminal Court.
16
An equally important and contemporaneous development was the establishment of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) or Tokyo Tribunal for the prosecution of Imperial Japanese war
criminals in connection with World War II-related offenses. Section III of the Charter of this Tribunal
dealt with the issue of fair trial. Since “the provisions of this section were similar to those contained in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal,” Zappalà, supra note 3, at 20 (2003), this Article will not undertake a
separate analysis of the criminal procedure elements of the IMTFE. See also Cassese, supra note 15, at 332
(“By and large, the Tokyo Charter was modeled on the Nuremberg Charter.”).
17
See Diane F. Orentlicher, International Criminal Law and the Cambodian Killing Fields, 3 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 705 (noting that with Nuremberg begins the recognition that certain crimes are of
universal concern and become the world’s responsibility); Peggy E. Rancilio, From Nuremberg to Rome:
Establishing an International Criminal Court and the Need for U.S. Participation, 78 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 299, 300 (2001); Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 5, at 413.
18
Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter], reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES
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August 8, 1945, the Charter of the IMT (“Nuremberg Charter” – attached to the London
Agreement) was signed.19 The Charter mandated that each of the four victorious allied
powers appoint one judge and one of four chief prosecutors.20 Pursuant to Articles 13
and 14 of the Charter, the Tribunal was to draft rules of procedure for review and
approval by a committee of the chief prosecutors.21 The approved Rules of Procedure
were then included in the Charter.22
The Charter and the Rules of Procedure yielded a skeletal set of due process
guarantees for the Nuremberg defendants:
(1)

At a reasonable time before trial, the right to be furnished with the
indictment, and all supporting documents lodged with the indictment,
as well as the Charter, an explanation of the right to counsel (listed
below), and a list of defense counsel, in a language which the accused
understands;

(2)

During any preliminary examination or trial, the right of the accused to
give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him;

(3)

The right to have the proceedings conducted in or translated into a
language the accused understands;

(4)

The right of the accused to conduct his own defense or have assistance
of counsel; and

(5)

The right, through himself or through his counsel, to present evidence
at trial in support of his defense and to cross-examine any witness
called by the prosecution.23

REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 420-29 (1949). See also
Rancilio, supra note 17, at 300; Jonathan A. Bush, Lex Americana: Constitutional Due Process and the
Nuremberg Defendants, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 515, 523 (2001).
19
Id. The London Agreement stated in Article 2 that “The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of
the International Military Tribunal shall be those set in the Charter annexed to this Agreement, which
Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement.” London Agreement of August 8, 1945 at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/itm/proc/imtchart.htm.
20
Michael P. Scharf, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 10 (1997).
21
Id. at 7.
22
See Howard S. Levie, War Crimes in the Persian Gulf, 1996 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC
L.J. 153, 157 (1996).
23
See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 18, art. 16; Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Rules of
Procedure at http://www.yale.edu.lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtrules.htm. See also Rancilio, supra note 17,
at 303. Other provisions in the Charter, which imposed certain duties on the IMT, had the indirect effect
of protecting defendants’ due process rights. For example, pursuant to Article 17, the IMT was accorded
powers such as the authority to summon witnesses, to order the production of documents or other
evidentiary materials, or to appoint court officers for the purpose of collecting evidence. Nuremberg
Charter, supra note 18, art. 17. Professor Zappalà points out, however, that these powers may not have
contributed toward a fair trial as they were not exercised in favor of the defense. See Zappalà, supra note 3,
at 19-20.
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This nascent form of international criminal procedure has been criticized as
fundamentally unfair.24 At least part of the criticism stems from the Tribunal’s attempts
to incorporate civil law features into the proceedings. “The general historical consensus
accepts the thesis that the Nuremberg Charter, its resulting rules of procedure and
evidence, and those of the courts that followed in its wake, were the result of a
compromise ‘blending and balancing elements of the Continental European inquisitorial
system and the Anglo-American adversarial system.’”25 This would have tended to dilute
due process protections because “it is generally recognized that the adversarial system is
more suitable when in comes to offering protection to the rights of the accused.”26 By
and large, under the civil law “inquisitorial” system, most of the documentary and
testimonial evidence is presented to an examining magistrate who assembles it in a
dossier.27 Copies of the magistrate’s dossier are provided to the defendant and to the
court prior to trial.28 The court, either on its own motion or at the request of one of the
parties, can question witnesses directly. Moreover, in contrast with the adversarial
system, cross-examination by opposing counsel is rare.29 As Professor Salvatore Zappalà
explains:
Generally speaking it may be recalled that these models
historically reflect different conceptions of ‘judicial truth.’ The
inquisitorial perspective generally considers that the objective of
the criminal process is ascertaining the truth; this is and should be
the overriding concern of the rules of criminal procedure. These
rules must enable the ‘inquisitor’ to extract the truth from the
suspect. On the other hand, from an accusatorial viewpoint the
process per se is what really matters. The establishment of
historical truth cannot be ensured other than through respect for
procedural rules, which constitute the method for reaching ‘judicial
truth.’ In the end, this differentiation reflects two opposing
epistemological beliefs: while for the inquisitorial paradigm there
is an objective truth that the ‘inquisitor’ must ascertain, for the

24

See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031,
2037 (1998) (“Prominent critics complain that the Nuremberg and Tokyo processes were tainted by
“victor’s justice,” including procedures and verdicts that were unfair to the defendants.”); Bassiouni, supra
note 6, at 408 (“By contemporary standards, however, the procedural rights afforded the defendants were
quite limited.”); KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 98-99 (1997) (faulting Nuremberg for inadequate procedural safeguards).
25
Evan J. Wallach, The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War Crimes Trials:
Did They Provide an Outline for International Legal Procedure?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 851, 854
(1999) (quoting Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 7-8 (1995)). See also Caianiello & Illuminati, supra
note 5, at 414 (“The Nuremberg Charter and Rules of Procedure tried to blend and balance elements of the
Continental European system, which is primarily inquisitorial, and the Anglo-American adversarial
system.”).
26
Zappalà, supra note 3, at 16.
27
Scharf, supra note 20, at 6.
28
Id. at 6-7.
29
Id.
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accusatorial approach the truth is the natural and logical result of a
pre-determined process.30
According to Professor Antonio Cassese, the upshot of this is that the Continental
system is “more geared toward the protection of the interests of society…” (i.e.,
providing for expeditious hearings and preventing delays).31 The Anglo-American
approach, on the other hand, is “bent on enhancing the rights of the accused and more
generally on ensuring respect for the fundamentals of ‘due process.’”32
In the specific case of the IMT, the inquisitorial influence meant that, instead of
live testimony subject to cross-examination, a large number of affidavits and depositions
were admitted into evidence, preventing the accused from confronting witnesses in open
court.33 Moreover, the proceedings have been described as “trial by ambush” – i.e.,
proceedings overly expedited (in the spirit of the Continental system)34 given the
enormity of the charges, the volume of the evidence and the novelty of the procedure and
rules for the defense attorneys.35
Other civil law influences, not necessarily written into the Charter, contributed
toward eroding the rights of the accused.36 In the first place, when the prosecution did
offer live testimony, civil law-trained defense counsel failed to interpose objections or
conduct effective cross-examination.37 Furthermore, the conditions and resources
available for the defense to undertake independent investigations, an essential component
of protecting the defendant’s rights in the adversarial model, were not adequate.38 Even
if they were, most of the civil law defense attorneys, accustomed as they were to a
magistrate taking the investigative laboring oar, could not grasp the importance of

30

Zappalà, supra note 3, at 16.
Cassese, supra note 15, at 383 (emphasis in original).
32
Id. (emphasis in original).
33
See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 18; Alvarez, supra note 24, at 2037. See also Michael P. Scharf, Have
We Really Learned the Lessons of Nuremberg, 149 MIL. L. REV. 65, 69 (1995) (“The Nuremberg Tribunal
has been severely criticized for allowing the prosecutors to introduce ex parte affidavits against the accused
over the objections of their attorneys. Such affidavits, it has been argued, seriously undermined the
defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him.”).
34
See Cassese, supra note 15, at 383. On the flip side, there was certainly no deprivation of the right to
a speedy trial.
35
See Alvarez, supra note 24, at 2037. On the other hand, certain civil law Charter provisions arguably
strengthened the rights of the accused. For example, contrary to the prevailing Anglo-American practice,
the Charter permitted defendants to make unsworn statements on their own behalf at the end of the trial.
See Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 5, at 415. Similarly, the Charter required, inconsistent with
standard common law rules, that the indictment detail the specific charges against the defendants and
include any supporting documents. Id.
36
See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 21 (“Two issues, however, must be distinguished: on the one hand, the
question of the fairness of the rules of procedure in abstract; on the other, their concrete application which
allegedly led to the substantial unfairness of the trials. It has been argued that the Rules were theoretically
adequate to give the defendants a fair trial and that it was in fact their application that was unfair.”).
37
See Alvarez, supra note 24, at 2037.
38
Id.
31
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conducting such investigations.39 Finally, abhorrent to common law notions of due
process but permissible in the civil law tradition, the IMT allowed for in absentia trials.40
These were not the only shortcomings. In the first place, there were absolutely
no due process safeguards for suspects during the investigation phase of the
proceedings.41 Protections were lacking at all other stages as well. For example, there
was no express rule on the presumption of innocence42 or the duty of the prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the accused.43 There was no right to remain silent, or a
right to provisional release.44 There was no double jeopardy protection.45 More
importantly, there was no right to appeal.46
Apart from the inquisitorial influence, why were such fundamental safeguards
lacking?47 Many reasons may be discerned but certain ones stand out. The “heinous
character” of the crimes “meant that an in-depth and thorough reflection on the protection
of the rights of persons accused of crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, and
war crimes was not easy.”48 Another equally apparent explanation is “the haste with
which the victors set up the Tribunals after having considered various options for dealing
with such novel, widespread, and large-scale crimes, allegedly committed not only by
servicemen in the field, but also by military and political leaders, as well as civilians
(such as industrialists, etc.).”49
39

Id.
For example, Martin Bormann, Nazi Party Chancellery Head Secretary and Private Secretary to
Adolph Hitler, was tried in absentia and found guilty. See Bush, supra note 18, at 536.
41
See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 45.
42
See Zappalà, id. note 3, at 21. However, in practice, a presumption of innocence and beyond-areasonable-doubt burden of proof for the prosecution obtained. Although this is not spelled out in the
Charter, it is reflected in the IMT’s written decisions. See, e.g. Hjalmar Schacht Decision [hereinafter
“Schacht Decision”], IMT Judgment, Oct. 1, 1946 reprinted in THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG
GERMANY 551-55 (1946) (“The case against Schacht therefore depends on the inference that Schacht did in
fact know of the Nazi aggressive plans. . . The Tribunal has considered the whole of this evidence with
great care, and comes to the conclusion that this necessary inference has not been established ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 554-55.
43
See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 21.
44
See id.
45
Indeed, the Nuremberg Charter expressly stated that any person convicted by the IMT could be
charged subsequently by a national court for any crime other than membership in a criminal organization.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 18, art. 11. In fact, three Nuremberg defendants who were acquitted -Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Fritzsche, and Franz von Papen -- were subsequently prosecuted in German courts.
See Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War
Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT’L L. 58, (1995).
46
Louise Arbour, Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice, 21 Fordham Int’l L. J.
531, 539 (1997) (“The Nuremberg Tribunal could and did impose the death penalty, and there was no right
of appeal.”).
47
It should be noted that perhaps the most frequent criticism lodged against the IMT was that it violated
the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege, which roughly translates to “no crime or
punishment for conduct is allowed without the previous existence of a law prohibiting that conduct and
providing for that punishment.” See Cassese, supra note 15, at 70-72.
48
See Zappalà, supra note 3, at 21-22.
49
Id. at 21.
40
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Perhaps less obvious to contemporary students of criminal justice is the fact that
many of the procedural protections we take for granted today were simply not available
in 1945. In the first place, the birth of the modern human rights movement, which
spawned the due process guarantees to which Western democracies are now so
accustomed, dates back only to the years after the Second World War ended.50 Thus, the
Nuremberg Charter would not have incorporated them as a normative point of repair.
Professor Zappalà points out that “most international standards relating to the protection
of fundamental rights in the administration of criminal justice had not yet been the object
of international law-making.”51
Only in 1948 does an incipient form of international human rights law begin to
emerge. On December 8 of that year, the General Assembly of the young United Nations
agreed on a Resolution that is known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR).52 Within this pioneering document, Articles 9 (right not to be exposed to
arbitrary arrest), 53 10 (right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal)54 and 11 (right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and prohibition
against ex post facto laws)55 limn the traits of a nascent, but non-binding, criminal
procedure.56 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which
gave teeth to and expanded the UDHR due process protections, was not even signed until
nearly twenty years later, in 1966.57 The ICCPR did not enter into force for another ten
years.58
50

See David Weissbrodt, An Introduction to the Sources of International Human Rights Law, C399
ALI-ABA 1, 7-9 (1989) (“[M]ost observers regard the formation of the United Nations and the
promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the beginning of the modern struggle to
protect human rights. . . Modern international human rights law arose in the 1940s.”). See also Jeffrey A.
Brauch, Why a Journal of International Law at Regent University School of Law, 1 REGENT J. INT’L. L. 1, 2
(2003) (“Although the human rights movement has historical antecedents, the current movement took
shape largely in response to atrocities committed just prior to and during World War II.”).
51
Zappalà, supra note 3, at 46.
52
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), UN Doc.
A/810, at 71(1948).
53
Id. art. 9.
54
Id. art. 10.
55
Id. art. 11.
56
See Safferling, supra note 12, at 22 (“This document [the UDHR] has never gained binding effect on
the Member States of the UN.”).
57
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A-6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. ICCPR Articles 9 and 10 prohibit arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. Articles 14 and 15 provide
for the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and the prohibition of ex post facto laws. The key
Article on the rights of persons accused in criminal proceedings is Article 14. This Article, much more
detailed than the corresponding provisions of the UDHR, details a panoply of minimum fair trial guarantees
for the accused in Paragraph 3 of Article 14. These include: the right to be informed of the charges, the
right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense, the right to be tried without
undue delay, the right to legal assistance, the right to examine witnesses and obtain their attendance, the
right to have an interpreter, and the privilege against self-incrimination. See Brenda Sue Thornton, The
New International Jurisprudence on the Right to Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick,
58 ALB. L. REV. 725, 734 n.64 (1995).
58
Thornton, supra note 57, at 734.
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These gradual international developments were mirrored by comparable regional
efforts during the same time period. Among these is the European Convention on Human
Rights (EHCR), which entered into force in 1950,59 and contains criminal procedure
fairness guarantees, primarily in Articles 6 (prohibiting ex post facto laws) and 7
(providing for a fair trial).60 In the Americas, Article 26 of the American Declaration of
Rights and Duties of Man (1948)61 and Article 8 of the American Convention on Human
Rights (1969)62 also embody comparable fair trial protections. Finally, the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981)63 ensures fair trial rights in its Article 7.
In the United States, the pantheon of landmark Warren Court rulings that ushered
in the criminal procedure “due process revolution of the 1960’s,”64 post-dated the
Nuremberg Charter by nearly two decades. These cases, and the principles they enshrine,
now seemingly ingrained in our judicial fabric, were simply not part of the criminal
procedure lexicon of the Nuremberg architects.65 These ground-breaking precedents
include: Wong-Sun v. United States66 (evidence that is “the fruit of the poisonous tree”
must be excluded); Gideon v. Wainwright67(indigent defendant has right to be provided at
trial with counsel at state’s expense)68; Brady v. Maryland69 (prosecutor has duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense); Massiah v. United States70 (restrictions on
post-indictment interrogations); Miranda v. Arizona71(certain warnings required before
police may interrogate a suspect in custody); Chapman v. California72 (infraction of basic

59

1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. No. 5, art. 3 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). This Convention is
enforced through the issuance of legally binding decisions through the European Court of Human Rights –
the Convention’s “functioning supervisory machinery.” Safferling, supra note 12, at 23.
60
Safferling, supra note 12, at 23.
61
American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, signed May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser.
L./V/II. 23. Doc. 21, rev. 6 (English 1979).
62
American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. L./V/II. 23. Doc. 21, rev. 2 (English 1979).
63
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986.
64
Bush, supra note 18, at 515. Zappalà, supra note 3, 46 n.50 (“In this respect it has also been clarified
that in 1945, even the US Supreme Court had not yet thoroughly developed its jurisprudence on fair trial
safeguards.”).
65
And this is significant, given the disproportionate American influence in the drafting process. See
Bush, supra note 18, at 519, 538. See also Cassese, supra note 15, at 353 (“This scheme [the IMT structure
and rules] was first drawn up in 1944 by an American officer . . . refined by other staff, subsequently
upheld by the US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and finally accepted by the other three Great Powers
in London in 1945.”).
66
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
67
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
68
It should be noted that at the time of Nuremberg, the United States Supreme Court had interpreted
due process as ensuring counsel to all defendants in capital cases, which the Nuremberg cases also were.
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
69
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
70
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
71
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
72
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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rights may not be treated as harmless error); United States v. Wade73, Gilbert v.
California74, Stovall v. Denno75 (mandated procedures to minimize mistaken
identification); Bruton v. United States76 (admission of non-testifying co-defendant’s
confession denies defendant his rights under the Confrontation Clause); Duncan v.
Louisiana77 and Baldwin v. New York78 (jury trial required where possible penalty
exceeds six months’ imprisonment); and Terry v. Ohio79 (prerequisite to “stop-and-frisk”
is reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity).
Thus, when viewed in the proper chronological context, the predominantly
American drafters of the Nuremberg Charter might be said to have “held themselves to so
much a higher legal standard . . .when federal courts at home took only infrequent steps
to insure the fairness of state investigatory and trial practices . . .”80 Exceeding the
protections already contemplated explicitly in the text of its Charter, the IMT provided in
practice for a presumption of innocence,81 a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof,82 and a prohibition against trying mentally incompetent defendants.83 It also
permitted defendants, upon motion, to examine documentary evidence in the hands of
occupation authorities; “in effect given access to the prosecution’s principal source of
evidence.”84 In fact, within the relative criminal procedure vacuum of 1945,
Nuremberg’s fledgling due process standards are considered by some to have adequately
“paid respect to the rights of the accused.”85 Considering “the atrocities that had taken
place and the suffering that was involved,” these commentators conclude that the
Nuremberg procedure was fundamentally “fair.”86 In fact, Professor Zappalà concludes:
“It is very difficult to deny that under those circumstances it was difficult to conduct a
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388 U.S. 218 (1967).
388 U.S. 263 (1967).
75
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
76
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
77
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
78
399 U.S. 66 (1970).
79
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
80
Bush, supra note 18, at 537.
81
See, e.g., the Schacht Decision, supra note 42, at 555; Bush, supra note 18, at 531-32. Likewise,
Professor Zappalà observes that “although the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters did not explicitly recognize
the presumption of innocence, it may be argued that it was accepted de facto. Indeed, Robert Jackson, the
US Prosecutor at the [IMT], conceded that ‘we accept that [the defendants] must be given a presumption of
innocence.’” Zappalà, supra note 3, at 84.
82
See, e.g., the Schacht Decision, supra note 42, at 555; Bush, supra note 18, at 531-32.
83
Bush, supra note 18, at 532-33. Bush cites to the example of the notorious Nazi industrialist Gustav
Krupp. On the eve of trial, Krupp was found to be mentally incompetent. Over the strenuous objections of
the prosecution, Krupp’s case was severed. Id.
84
Bush, supra note 18, at 528.
85
See, e.g., Safferling, supra note 12, at 22. Bassiouni, supra note 6, at 407-08 (“The legal
amalgamation, according to Justice Jackson, worked to the advantage of the defendants in that they could,
for example, take the stand and testify under oath in their own defense or simply present an unsworn
statement to the court at the end of a trial without submitting to cross-examination.”).
86
Id. See also Bush, supra note 18, at 528. Bush points as well to Nuremberg’s acquittals, such as the
not-guilty verdict of former German Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht (see Schacht Decision, supra note
42, at 555) as further proof of its inherent fairness. Bush, supra note 18, at 528.
74
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fairer trial.”87 These observations seem to vindicate Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson’s
oft-quoted opening that certainly paid obeisance to due process:
There is a dramatic disparity between the circumstances of
the accusers and the accused that might discredit our work
if we should falter in even minor matters, in being fair and
temperate . . . We must never forget that the record on
which we judge these defendants is the record on which
history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a
poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well. We must
summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our
task that this trial will commend itself to posterity as
fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to do justice.88
As demonstrated above, in Nuremberg’s wake, and perhaps partly because of
Nuremberg, an international due process revolution would soon take place. The
achievements of that revolution would be reflected in the next phase of developing an
international criminal procedure: the advent of the ad hoc tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
B.

The Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

After the global conflagration that gave rise to Nuremberg, the Cold War had an
extreme chilling effect on the growth of international criminal law.89 With the end of bipolar hostilities in the early 1990s, though, ethnic tensions, which had been quelled in
certain parts of the world during the hegemonic post-War years, began bubbling to the
surface. In the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda they exploded into “ethnic cleansing”
and genocide.90
In February 1993, pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security
Council declared that ethnic atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia constituted “a
threat to international peace,” and that the establishment of an ad hoc international
criminal tribunal would “contribute to the restoration of peace.”91 As a result, the
Security Council directed the Secretary-General to prepare a report setting out the
necessary details for implementing its decision to create a tribunal.92 On May 8, 1993,
the Secretary-General submitted the requested report to the Security Council with a
proposed Statute for a tribunal.93 On May 25, 1993, the Security Council created the
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Zappalà, supra note 3, at 46 n. 49.
2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 101
(1949). See also Christensen, supra note 13, at 394.
89
See Cassese, supra note 15, at 334.
90
Id. at 335.
91
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 317th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
92
Id.
93
See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General], U.N. Doc. S/2504 (1993),
88
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) by adopting the
proposed Statute.94
Soon thereafter, the Security Council responded in a similar way to the 1994
genocide in Rwanda. Once again acting under its Chapter VII powers, it created the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) by Resolution 955 of November 8,
1994.95 The ICTR is governed by its Statute, which is annexed to Security Council
Resolution 955.96
The ICTY adopted its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”) on February 11,
1994. The rules came into force on March 14, 1994.97 The ICTY acted pursuant to
Article 15 of its Statute mandating it to adopt “rules of procedure and evidence for the
conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of
evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses, and other appropriate matters.”98
Similarly, in accord with Article 14 of its Statute, the ICTR adopted its own RPE, which
became effective on June 29, 1995 [hereinafter ICTR RPE].99
In terms of human rights, the world in which these RPEs were formulated bore
little resemblance to that of 1945, when a new international criminal procedure was cut
out of whole cloth for Nuremberg. As one commentator has observed: “…fifty years
have elapsed since the Nuremberg prosecutions began and human wisdom has become
increasingly conscious of the prohibitions against violating fundamental human
rights…”100 By the 1990s, that knowledge had inspired the globe to embrace a plethora of
human rights instruments in addition to the ones already discussed above, including, inter
alia: the Geneva Conventions,101 the Genocide Convention,102 the Convention Against

reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163. The annex to this Report contains the Statute of the tribunal. Id., Annex at 36,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1192.
94
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1203, 1204 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
95
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
96
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., Annex, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
97
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994) [herinafter ICTY RPE].
98
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 84.
99
The ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence [hereinafter ICTR RPE] “do not carry a UN document
number.” Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S. Gallant, Appeals in the Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 589, 609 n.100 (2001).
100
Father Robert Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights and Self-Determination: The Meaning of
International Law, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1477, 1489 (2001).
101
Four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflict, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3217,
3316, 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
102
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered
into force Jan. 12, 1951.
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Torture,103 the Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination,104 the Convention on
the Rights of the Child,105 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 106 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.107
These treaties, and the strengthening of human rights they embodied, presaged an
expansion of due process guarantees for defendants at the two ad hoc Tribunals. As one
commentator has noted:
One of the most fundamental principles of human rights, as
stated above, ‘is the protection of individual liberty,
especially from the undue exercise of state power.’ This
principle is also applicable at the international level and the
concern for personal liberty is reflected in the Statutes of
the ICTY and ICTR and their Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. These instruments limit the extent to which
persons may be deprived of their liberty before they are
brought to trial and set out rules aimed at preventing the
innocent from being convicted and imprisoned by
protecting the integrity of the trial itself.108
Accordingly, the due process advances of the two ad hoc Tribunals may be
gleaned from a distillation of their structures and rules. Since the ICTR “adopted most
rules of [the] ICTY without major amendment,”109 this section of the Article will focus
on the ICTY’s structure and rules.110

103

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
1465 U.N.T.S. 113, entered into force June 26, 1987.
104
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan.
4, 1969.
105
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.
106
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13,
entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.
107
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976.
108
Stuart Beresford, Redressing the Wrongs of the International Justice System: Compensation for
Persons Erroneously Detained, Prosecuted, or Convicted by the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 628,
631 (2002).
109
Catherine Cissé, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Some
Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 116 (1997).
110
At the time the ICTR RPE was adopted, the only noteworthy difference between it and the ICTY
RPE related to the rule on provisional measures during investigations. ICTR RPE Rule 40 permitted the
Prosecutor “upon showing that a major impediment does not allow the State to keep the Suspect under
provisional detention … apply to a Judge … for an order to transfer the suspect to the seat of the Tribunal
… and to detain him there provisionally. [Thereafter the] suspect shall be released if: i) the Chamber so
rules, or ii) the Prosecutor fails to issue an indictment within twenty days of the transfer.” ICTR RPE,
supra note 99, R. 40 (1995). See Cissé, supra note 109, at 116-17. This exception to the rule of nondetention was not subsequently expanded in Rule 40 of the ICTY. Id.
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1.

Structure

The organizational chart of the ICTY can be divided into three principal
functions: adjudicative, prosecutorial and administrative.111 These respective functions
are assigned to three principal and separate organs: (1) the Chambers (including three
Trial Chambers and one Appeals Chamber), (2) the Prosecutor and (3) the Registry.112
The Registry, which is responsible for all administrative matters relating to the
ICTY, serves both the Prosecutor and the Chambers.113 Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal,
the ICTY (and ICTR, for that matter) is truly international -- prosecutors, judges and
members of the registry come from countries around the world.114
Of these three ICTY organs, the Office of the Prosecutor plays perhaps the most
significant role in determining the Tribunal’s agenda. It is tasked with investigating,
preparing indictments, and trying alleged criminals.115 The Prosecutor initiates
investigations ex officio -- in other words, without the review or authorization of any
other Tribunal organ.116
2.

Procedure

In general, there are six procedural steps in the ICTY’s pre-trial stage.117 First, as
just described, the Prosecutor initiates the investigation. During the investigation phase,
the Prosecutor has the power to question suspects, victims, and witnesses, to collect
evidence, and to conduct on-site investigations.118 In carrying out these tasks, the
Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the assistance of the State authorities concerned.119
ICTY RPE Rule 40 authorizes the Prosecutor to request any State concerned, as a matter
of urgency: (i) to arrest a suspect provisionally; (ii) to seize physical evidence; and (iii) to
take all necessary measures to prevent the escape of a suspect or an accused, injury to or
intimidation of a victim or witness, or the destruction of evidence.
Second, if the Prosecutor determines that a prima facie case exists, she prepares
an indictment containing a concise statement of facts and crimes with which the accused
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ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 11. See also Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The
Rights of the Accused and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT’L LEGAL
PERSP. 111, 142 (1998).
112
ICTY Statute, supra note 94, arts. 12 - 17.
113
Id. art. 17.
114
See, e.g., id., art. 12 (“The Chambers shall be composed of sixteen permanent independent judges,
no two of whom may be nationals of the same State . . .”).
115
Id. art. 16.
116
Id. art. 18.
117
Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which Is the Oxymoron? An
Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 475, 488 (1995).
118
Id.
119
Id.
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is charged.120 Third, the Prosecutor transmits the indictment to a designated trial
chamber judge.121 Fourth, the designated trial chamber judge confirms the indictment if
she agrees that it presents a prima facie case.122 Otherwise, the judge dismisses the
indictment.123 Fifth, if the indictment is confirmed, at the request of the Prosecutor or sua
sponte, the judge may issue an arrest warrant for the accused if the accused is not already
in the ICTY’s custody.124 Finally, after the arrest and transfer of the accused to the
control of the ICTY, he is brought before a trial chamber judge, “without delay,” for an
arraignment proceeding, during which a date for trial is scheduled.125
If the accused pleads guilty, and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the guilty plea
was informed, made voluntarily, not equivocal, and supported by a sufficient factual
basis, then the Registrar will set a date for the sentencing hearing.126
Assuming the accused pleads not guilty, Article 21 of the ICTY Statute provides
for a “fair” trial and enumerates various requirements to guarantee fairness. Those
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ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 18. See also ICTY RPE, supra note 97, R. 47(b). The ICTY RPE
replaces the phrase “prima facie case” with the phrase “sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds
for believing that a suspect has committed a crime.” ICTY RPE, id. R. 47(A).
121
ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 18. An indictment may join two or more persons charged with the
same crime or with different crimes committed in the course of the same transaction. ICTY RPE, supra
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122
ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 19(1). An indictment may be amended without leave at any time
before its confirmation. Thereafter, amendment must be by leave of the trial chamber. ICTY RPE, supra
note 97, R. 50. Similarly, an indictment may be withdrawn without leave at any time before its
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on the accused. Id. R. 53. Nondisclosure at this stage is intended to ensure that the accused does not, on
hearing of the indictment, disappear so as to avoid arrest and trial. Id. R. 53(B). See also Daniel D. Ntanda
Nsereko, A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Substantive and
Procedural Issues, 5 CRIM. L. F. 507, 529 (1994).
123
ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 19 (1). The dismissal of an indictment or a count does not preclude
the prosecutor from subsequently bringing a new indictment or count based on the acts underlying that
indictment or count providing that there is additional evidence to support it. ICTY RPE, supra note 97, R.
47(E).
124
ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 19 (2). See also ICTY RPE, supra note 97, R.R. 54-61. The
warrant must be accompanied by a copy of the indictment and a statement of the accused’s rights. Id., R.
55(C). The rights of the accused will be discussed infra. The state authorities to which the warrant is
transmitted must execute it promptly and diligently. Id., R. 56. The local authorities cannot set up their
national laws or existing treaty obligations as an excuse for not surrendering the accused, since the
obligations they assume under Article 29 of the Statute [Co-operation and Judicial Assistance] override
such laws or treaty obligations. Where the national authorities are unable to execute an arrest warrant, they
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If, after the lapse of a reasonable time, no report is made, “this shall be deemed a failure to execute the
warrant of arrest” and the Tribunal, through the President, “may notify the Security Council accordingly.”
Id., R. 59(B).
125
ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 20; ICTY RPE, supra note 97, art. 62.
126
ICTY RPE, supra note 97, art. 62 bis.
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requirements will be discussed infra. The rules provide for preliminary motions,127 a pretrial conference,128 and a “pre-defense” conference.129 The trial itself takes place before
the trial chamber to which the matter has been assigned (i.e., the case is tried to three
judges).130 The judgment must be rendered by a majority of the judges of the trial
chamber (i.e., at least two of three) and must be delivered by the trial chamber in
public.131 It must be accompanied by “a reasonable opinion in writing, to which separate
or dissenting opinions may be appended.”132 Both the convicted defendant and the
Prosecutor have the right to appeal the trial chamber’s decisions (based on both errors of
fact and law).133 The appeals chamber may affirm, reverse, or revise the decisions of the
trial chamber.134
3.

Rights of the Accused

The post-World War II advances in the due process rights of criminal defendants
“are an explicit component of the [ICTY]’s legal framework.”135 In his commentary
regarding procedural issues and the rights of the accused at the time of the Tribunal’s
creation, the U.N. Secretary-General stated that it “is axiomatic that the International
Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of
the accused at all stages of its proceedings.”136 In fact, the due process guarantees
incorporated into the ICTY Statute roughly reflect those found in Article 14 of the
ICCPR,137 an instrument cited by the Secretary-General as reflective of the
internationally recognized standards of the rights of criminal defendants.138 These rights
of the accused, which are “subject” to the provisions of Article 22 (dealing with victimwitness protection),139 include:
127

ICTY RPE, id. R.R. 72, 73. These motions are brought before a specially designated “Pre-Trial
Judge” who handles pre-trial issues between the parties, establishes a pre-trial litigation schedule, and
enforces it. See id., R. 65 ter.
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International Tribunal shall provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for the protection of victims and
witnesses. Such protection measures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera
proceedings and the protection of the victim’s identity.”
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(a)

To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which
he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against
him;

(b)

To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defense and to communicate with counsel of his own
choosing;

(c)

To be tried without undue delay;

(d)

To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person
or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right;
and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case
where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by him in any such case if he does not have
sufficient means to pay for it;

(e)

To examine, or to have examined, the witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him;

(f)

To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in the International
Tribunal; and

(g)

Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
guilt.140

The above-enumerated ICCPR Article 14 rights, only referring to “hearings
before a tribunal,”141 do not paint the entire due process picture at the ICTY because “the
commencement of investigations can hardly be understood as a hearing before a
tribunal.”142 Indeed, both the ICTY Statute and RPE contain additional investigativephase protections. Article 18(3) of the Statute provides: “If questioned, the suspect shall
be entitled to be assisted by counsel of his own choice, including the right to have legal
assistance assigned to him without payment by him in any such case if he does not have
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Id. art. 21(4). Pursuant to Rule 82 of the ICTY RPE [Joint and Separate Trials], in joint trials, each
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sufficient means to pay for it, as well as to necessary translation into and from a language
he speaks and understands.”143
The RPE goes further. Pursuant to Rule 42, a suspect who is to be questioned by
the Prosecutor is accorded the following rights, of which the Prosecutor must inform the
suspect prior to questioning, in a language the suspect understands:
(a)

The right to be assisted by counsel of the suspect’s choice
or to be assigned legal assistance without payment if the
suspect does not have sufficient means to pay for it;

(b)

The right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if the
suspect cannot understand or speak the language to be used
for questioning; and

(c)

The right to remain silent, and to be cautioned that any
statement the suspect makes shall be recorded and may be
used in evidence.144

Moreover, questioning of the suspect may not take place without the presence of
counsel unless the suspect has waived the right to counsel.145 Nevertheless, even in the
case of waiver, if the suspect subsequently expresses a desire to have counsel, the
Prosecutor must stop the questioning and may resume only when the suspect has obtained
counsel.146 Finally, whenever a prosecutor questions a suspect, Rule 43 of the RPE
requires that the session be audio or video-recorded.147 According to Professor
Christopher Safferling this “is the most effective safeguard against undue pressure from
the interrogator” and it “enhances the ICTY’s ability to determine whether a statement
was made voluntarily.” 148
As a means of enforcing these safeguards, RPE Rule 95 bars admission of any
evidence “obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability” or whose
admission would be “antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the
proceedings.”149
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Other rights are embedded in various articles of the Statute. For example,
pursuant to Article 13, the accused has the right to be tried by judges of high moral
character, impartiality and integrity who possess experience in criminal and international
law and qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the
highest judicial offices.150 Article 10 incorporates the principle of “ne bis in idem,” an
equivalent to the American double jeopardy protection that essentially prevents a person
from being tried twice for the same crime.151 As for sentencing, in contrast to
Nuremberg, the ICTY does not permit punishment by death.152 Similarly, also different
from Nuremberg, it allows defendants to appeal their convictions.153
C.

The International Criminal Court

In a decade whose opening ended the Cold War and ushered in mass internecine
violence in Europe and Africa and whose middle resuscitated the dormant dreams of
Nuremberg, it was perhaps fitting that the 1990s should close with the creation of a
permanent global criminal tribunal. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (“Rome Statute”) was signed on July 17, 1998 at the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
(“ICC”).154 Two years later, the ICC adopted its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.155
The ICC has been described as “the culmination of five decades of progress
toward the realization of protection for human rights throughout the world.”156 As a
result, the ICC represents the most advanced level of protection to date of the rights of
defendants in international criminal proceedings.157 This growth in due process
150
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safeguards, however, is not merely an incidental byproduct of a cresting human rights
trend. Instead, “for the first time in history, these [ICC criminal procedure] rules were
adopted by States clearly having in mind that one day these rights might be applicable to
proceedings instituted against their own citizens.”158
Nevertheless, rather than re-invent the proverbial wheel, the ICC’s criminal
procedure takes the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as its
starting point. As a result, the ICC incorporates much of the structural and due process
elements of the ad hoc tribunals.159 Still, to analyze the ICC’s due process expansion vis
à vis the ad hoc tribunals, its structure, rules and rights should be examined
independently.
1.

Structure

With some slight modifications, the basic organic structure of the ICC largely
resembles those of the ad hoc Tribunals.160 Article 34 of the Rome Statute states that the
ICC shall be composed of the following organs: the Presidency, in other words, the
President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents under Article 38 (comprising the
main steering committee of the Court); an Appeals Division, a Trial Division, and a PreTrial Division (those four “organs” composing the Court proper); the Office of the
Prosecutor; and the Registry.161 The Presidency and the various judicial chambers are
responsible for the Court’s judicial function. The Office of the Prosecutor carries out the
ICC’s investigative and prosecutorial functions. And the Registry is the principal
administrative organ of the Court.162
The Statute allows for eighteen full-time judges (including members of the
Presidency).163 The Appellate Division is composed of the President and four other
judges, while the Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions each require not less than six
judgeships.164 Each Trial Chamber consists of three judges while each Pre-Trial
Chamber may consist of three judges or a single judge “in accordance with [the] Statute
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”165
158
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The Office of the Prosecutor is primarily responsible for “receiving referrals and
any substantiated information on crimes” within the ICC’s jurisdiction and “conducting
investigations and prosecutions before the Court.”166 The Registry, acting under the
authority of the Presidency, deals with the “non-judicial aspects of the administration and
servicing of the Court, without prejudice to the functions and powers of the
Prosecutor.”167
2.

Procedure

Proceedings at the ICC may be initiated in one of three ways. The first two ways
consist of (1) the Security Council (acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter) or (2) a State Party referring a crime or crimes to the Prosecutor for
investigation.168 The third way entails the Prosecutor’s initiating a proceeding “proprio
motu (i.e., on the Prosecutor’s own motion) on the basis of information on crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court.”169
In the case of investigations initiated by State Parties or proprio motu, as a
threshold matter, the Prosecutor must first determine whether “there would be a
reasonable basis to commence an investigation.”170 If the Prosecutor is satisfied that
there is such a basis, he must notify “all States Parties and those States, which, taking into
account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes
concerned.”171 Only if there is no relevant State criminal investigation/prosecution taking
place, or if one taking place is clearly “unwilling or unable” to do justice, may the
Prosecutor initiate investigations proper.172
In the case of proprio motu initiation, Article 15 requires that a preliminary
investigation or “inquiry,”173 precede an investigation proper. The “inquiry” consists of a
search for information or the gathering of evidence about an alleged crime, for the
166
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purpose of establishing if there is “a reasonable basis to proceed with the
investigation.”174 The Prosecutor bases the initiation of this proprio motu inquiry on any
relevant information he may have received from any reliable source, as well as “written
or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.”175 If the Prosecutor establishes that such a
“reasonable basis” exists, he must submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a “request for
authorization of an investigation.”176 If the Pre-Trial Chamber grants the request, the
Prosecutor may commence the investigation.177
Notwithstanding this authorization, the Security Council, by mere request to the
Court through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, will obtain a
twelve-month suspension of any investigation or prosecution, either before its
commencement or while it is under way.178 Moreover, the Security Council may renew
such a request under the same conditions.179
Assuming the investigation goes forward, however, the Prosecutor is not merely
an adversarial party to the proceedings. As set forth in Article 54 of the Rome Statute,
she is bound to search for, gather, and pass on to the defense both incriminating and
exonerating evidence equally.180 In this sense, the Prosecutor acts as an “organ of
justice” rather than just an opposing party in a contest.181
During the investigation, the Prosecutor has no power to take forcible measures
on the territory of a State.182 This is owing to Article 99 of the Rome Statute, which
affords the Prosecutor rather limited powers to conduct on-site investigations.183 This
entails that “intrusive measures, such as searches and seizures will have to be executed by
the State Party upon request by the ICC.”184
Once the investigation is initiated, the Prosecutor must apply to the Pre-Trial
Chamber for the issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons to appear before the
Court.185 A State must promptly surrender the designated person to the Court after the
State’s judiciary determines that the person’s identity matches that of the warrant and all
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corresponding rights have been respected.186 Once the suspect is placed in the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s custody, a hearing, in the presence of the suspect and his counsel, is
conducted to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to try the case.187
Before the Chamber rules on the sufficiency of evidence to bind the suspect over for trial,
the suspect is permitted at the hearing to object to the charges, challenge the Prosecutor’s
evidence, and present his own evidence.188
During the pre-trial phase, the suspect may apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for
“interim release” pending trial.189 Also during this phase, the Prosecutor may amend the
charges after giving notice to the accused and provided that the Pre-Trial Chamber
permits the amendment.190 It is also during this phase that the Prosecutor must proceed to
the disclosure of collected “evidentiary” materials and the defense must disclose certain
matters to the Prosecution, including the assertion and substance of any alibi defense.191
Relying on the trial procedures established by the ad hoc Tribunals, “a similar system is
envisaged for the ICC.”192
3.

Rights of the Suspect and the Accused

The ICC has been described as “explicitly bound by respect for human rights.”193
Indeed, pursuant to Article 54 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must “fully respect the
186
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rights of persons arising under this Statute.”194 Further, Article 21 makes clear that the
ICC is bound by “principles and rules of international law” and that its interpretation of
law must be “consistent with internationally recognized human rights.”195
a.

Pre-Trial Rights

During the pre-trial phase, the nomenclature for persons under investigation is
bifurcated into (1) persons in respect of an investigation; and (2) persons for whom there
are grounds to believe they committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.196 For
the former, Paragraph 1 of Article 55 explicitly guarantees the following due process
protections:
(a)

The right not to incriminate oneself or confess guilt;

(b)

The right not to be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to
torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment;

(c)

The right to an interpreter and to such translations as are necessary to meet
the requirements of fairness; and

(d)

The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention and not to be
deprived of liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedures as are established in the Statute.197

Sub-section (d) above does not specify which “procedures” established in the
Statute would apply. However, the grounds for arrest and certain guarantees for persons
arrested are laid out elsewhere in the Statute. Article 58, for example, specifies that the
arrest warrant must contain concise information for the arrested person concerning the
reasons for the arrest and the crimes allegedly committed.198 Article 58 also specifies the
grounds on which the Pre-Trial Chamber may issue a warrant of arrest. In the first place,
there must be reasonable grounds for believing the person has committed a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court.199 Moreover, the arrest must be necessary to ensure the
attendance of that person at trial, to prevent obstruction of investigations, and, where
applicable, to prevent the commission of other related crimes.200
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One other important arrest-related right must be mentioned.201 Article 85
provides that “[a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.”202 Chapter 10 of the ICC RPE sets out the
rules and procedures related to this right of compensation. With respect to determining
the proper amount of compensation, ICC RPE Rule 175 requires the competent Chamber
to “take into consideration the consequences which the grave and manifest miscarriage of
justice has had for the personal, family, social and professional situation of the person
filing the request.”203
Rome Statute Article 55, Section 2 enumerates the rights of persons who are
believed to have committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. Those rights are
triggered when such persons are “about to be questioned either by the Prosecutor, or by
national authorities pursuant to a request” made by the Prosecutor.204 They include:
(a)

The right to be informed, prior to being questioned, that there are grounds
to believe the suspect committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court;

(b)

The right to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in
the determination of guilt or innocence;

(c)

The right to have legal assistance of the suspect’s choosing, or, if the
suspect does not have legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to
him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by the suspect in any case if the suspect does not have sufficient
means to pay for it; and

(d)

The right to be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person has
voluntarily waived his right to counsel.205

The person must be informed of these rights prior to being questioned.206
Consistent with these rights, ICC RPE Rule 112 requires that any questioning of the
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suspect be audio or video-recorded.207 Furthermore, specific mechanisms for the
implementation of the suspect’s right to obtain evidence in his favor prior to trial were
adopted in ICC RPE Rule 116.208 Finally, as an indirect means of enforcing these due
process safeguards, the Statute contains the following two-pronged exclusionary rule in
Article 69.7:
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or
internationally recognized human rights shall not be
admissible if:
(a)

The violation casts substantial doubt on the
reliability of the evidence; or

(b)

The admission of the evidence would be
antithetical to and would seriously damage
the integrity of the proceedings.209
b.

Trial Rights

ICC trial proceedings are meant to ensure “full respect for the rights of the
accused . . .”210 The means for achieving this are found primarily in Articles 66 and 67 of
the Rome Statute. Article 66 provides that “everyone” shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty before the Court in accordance with the applicable law.211 It also specifies
the burden of proof by declaring that the onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of
the accused.212 Finally, Article 66 spells out the standard of proof: in order to convict,
the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt.”213
Article 67 lays out a smorgasbord of additional trial-stage protections, including
the right: (1) to a fair and impartial hearing; (2) to be informed promptly and in detail of
the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a language which the accused fully
understands and speaks; (3) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the
defense and to communicate freely with counsel of the accused’s choosing in confidence;
(4) to be tried without undue delay; (5) to be present at the trial; (6) to conduct the
defense in person or through legal assistance chosen by the accused; (7) to be informed, if
the accused does not have legal assistance, of this right; (8) to have legal assistance
assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it; (9) to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (10) to raise
defenses and present other evidence admissible under the Statute; (11) to have, if
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

ICC RPE, supra note 155, R. 112.
Id. R. 116.
Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 69.7.
Id. art. 64.
Id. art. 66.1.
Id. art. 66.2.
Id. art. 66.3.

27

necessary, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations
as are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness; (12) to remain silent and not to be
compelled to testify or to confess guilt, without such silence being a consideration in the
determination of guilt or innocence; (13) to make an unsworn oral or written statement in
his defense; (14) not to have imposed on him any reversal of the burden of proof or any
onus of rebuttal; (15) to have the Prosecutor disclose any evidence which tends to show
the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect
the credibility of prosecution evidence.214
Certain additional rights are scattered throughout the Statute. For example, a
person may not be criminally responsible, unless the conduct in question constitutes, at
the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court (embodying the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege).215 Similarly, a person convicted by the Court may
be punished only in accordance with the Statute (and not by some other external means –
codifying the rule of nulla poena sine lege).216 In the same vein, no person may be
criminally responsible for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute (enshrining
the protection against ex post facto laws).217 Finally, the ICC, or any other court, may not
try persons for conduct that formed the basis of crimes for which the persons have
already been convicted or acquitted by the ICC (respecting the rule of ne bis in idem,
which is more or less equivalent to the double jeopardy prohibition).218
Paralleling the ICTY and ICTR, another important right for the accused is to be
tried by judges competent in criminal law/procedure and international law and who
possess extensive experience in “a professional legal capacity.”219 Moreover, any such
judges must adequately represent the principal legal systems of the world, and reflect
equitable geographic and gender representation.220 These judges must be independent in
the performance of their functions and not engage in any activity that is likely to interfere
with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their independence.221 Article 41
provides a mechanism for defendants to request the disqualification of a judge whose
impartiality may be reasonably doubted.222
With respect to sentencing, the ICC, like the ad hoc Tribunals, forbids the death
penalty.223 Moreover, it also provides convicted defendants with a right to appeal.224
Although most of these rights are consistent with those accorded to suspects and
214
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defendants in the ad hoc Tribunal systems, there are some important differences that will
be highlighted below.
4.

The Expansion of Rights Vis à Vis the Ad Hoc Tribunals

The relationship between the ICC prosecutor and judiciary provides significant
insight into the ICC’s superior due process treatment of defendants in comparison to the
ad hoc Tribunals. As one commentator has noted, “the ICC prosecutor is overseen at
every stage by the judiciary . . .”225 This scrutiny, particularly during the investigative
stage, helps ensure that the due process rights of suspect and accused are respected. For
example, in contrast with the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC requires that the prosecutor seek
confirmation of a judge before the provisional arrest of a suspect.226 Moreover, the
“organ of justice” role of the ICC prosecutor, as defined in Rule 54 of the Rome Statute,
provides another structural layer of due process protection not found in the more
adversarial setting of the ad hoc Tribunals. These structural innovations move the ICC
past the ad hoc Tribunals on the fairness spectrum, opposite Nuremberg’s perceived
“victor’s justice.”227
Certain specific provisions in the ICC system have the same effect. For example,
Article 16 allows the Security Council to suspend an investigation for twelve months
with the option of renewing the suspension indefinitely. This mechanism within the
Statute (apart from, and in addition to, the powers exercised by the Pre-Trial Chamber)
could be used, for example, to derail an illegitimately motivated investigation or one that
resulted in serious due process violations. There is no such check on the prosecutor’s
powers in the ad hoc Tribunal system.
Moreover, the ICC’s Article 55 rights of “persons during an investigation”
include an explicit right not to be subject to unlawful or arbitrary arrest as well as a right
not to be subject to “coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.” 228 The Statutes and RPEs of the ad hoc Tribunals
omit reference to any such right.229
Consistent with the above-mentioned Article 55 rights, Article 59 of the Rome
Statute hints at a stronger degree of agency between the ICC and States cooperating in
arrest and detention by labeling the latter as “custodial States.”230 Under the Rules of the
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ad hoc Tribunals, however, the supervisory responsibilities of the Tribunal do not attach
until “the moment of . . . transfer (to actual custody of the Tribunal).”231
Similarly, Article 85 of the Rome Statute recognizes a degree of ICC “cradle-tograve supervisory power”232 by granting an “enforceable right to compensation”233 for
anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention.234 Once again, there is
no comparable provision in the statutes or rules of the ad hoc Tribunals.235
Another important ICC procedural safeguard is the right of the suspect, pursuant
to Rome Statute Article 61, to participate with counsel in the indictment confirmation
hearing. The ad hoc Tribunals, adhering to a model of ex parte indictment review,
provide for no such participation.
Further, “in the ICC Statute the protection of the presumption of innocence is
definitely more clearly organized [than the equivalent for the ad hoc Tribunals] and the
provisions of the Statute take into account the multifaceted aspects of the presumption . .
.”236 In particular, Article 66 of the Rome Statute states that everyone shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty.”237 The use of the term “everyone” stretches the
presumption to cover more than just the accused.238 Moreover, the impact of the
presumption has a ripple effect on evidentiary matters in the ICC. Article 67.1(i) states
that no reversal of the burden of proof is admissible. According to Professor Zappalà:
This is a major breakthrough because in the system of the ad hoc
Tribunals there are reversals that virtually require a probatio
diabolica. Instances of this are: proof that the confession was
forced (Rule 92 RPEs) or the burden being placed on the accused
to prove that circumstances exist that may justify provisional
release established in Rule 65 of both RPEs.239
Finally, absent in the statutes and rules of the ad hoc Tribunals, the accused on trial
before the ICC have “the right to make an unsworn oral or written statement in his/her
defense.”
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Overall, then, the ICC represents a great leap forward in the due process evolution
of international criminal procedure. But it does not encompass the full panoply of
protections afforded to defendants in the most rights-protective national systems. The
reasons for this will be explored in the following section.
III.

FORCES LIMITING DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

From the London Charter to the Rome Statute, the community of nations has
gradually woven together a procedural safety net for those accused in transnational courts
of participating in large-scale, systematic violence. That safety net, cast widely over the
constituent instruments of international justice, is in certain respects too porous to
preserve the full complement of due process rights owed to suspected war criminals and
genocidaires. The reality of global criminal prosecution, unfortunately, is often much too
messy and complex for the best-intentioned due process schemas hatched by treaty
negotiations and committee meetings.240 Those efforts may be stymied by three recurring
phenomena unique to international criminal prosecution: (1) the fragmentation of
enforcement over two or more jurisdictions; (2) the integration of two distinct, and often
contradictory, legal systems – the common law and the civil law; and (3) the extreme
gravity of the crimes involved.
A.

Fragmentation

As distinct from national criminal procedure systems, international criminal
procedure is “fragmented” between and among multiple jurisdictions.”241 For example,
while an international tribunal may issue an arrest warrant, that warrant will be executed
by a sovereign national jurisdiction. That sovereign may then detain and question the
suspect before he is transferred to the jurisdiction of the international court. Yet another
sovereign may conduct searches and collect evidence to be used in prosecuting the
suspect. Despite its best due process intentions, an international tribunal has limited
control, if any, over the manner in which these searches are conducted or in which the
suspect is arrested, detained or questioned.242 As a result, “the disjunction between
authority and control, common to international institutions, is too great to allow for
consistently fair criminal adjudication.”243
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1.

Search and Seizure

With respect to searches and seizures, fragmentation could lead to the trampling
of privacy rights by sovereign nationals. The Rome Statute, for example, affords the
ICC, through Article 99(4), only very limited powers to conduct on-site investigations.244
“This entails that intrusive measures, such as searches and seizures will have to be
executed by the State Party upon request by the ICC.” This could open the door to
serious due process issues because the Rome Statute does not contain any express
language providing for a search and seizure right to privacy.245 Thus “U.N. troops,
national police, governmental agents, or civilian vigilantes” could “ignore the privacy
interests of suspects or accused persons . . . in the perceived greater interest of promoting
justice and eradicating impunity for heinous crimes . . .”246 Moreover, any evidence
obtained from such searches could be admissible because “the ICC statute does not
permit investigation into how a state collects evidence brought before the court . . .”247
2.

Arrest and Detention

In the same spirit, this reliance on external agents can compromise the due
process rights of international criminal defendants with respect to arrest and detention.
As explained supra, the ad hoc Tribunals provide for the provisional arrest of suspects by
States. The Prosecutor may directly request a State to arrest a suspect on the standard
that there are “grounds to believe” that the suspect “may have committed a crime over
which the Tribunal has jurisdiction.”248 The rights of the suspect include the right to
counsel and the right to remain silent.249
In a string of decisions ruling on defense motions for release, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has consistently held that the Tribunal has “no jurisdiction
over the conditions of any arrest, detention or other measures carried out by a sovereign
State at the request of the Tribunal.”250 This has resulted in questionable due process
jurisprudence.
244
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In Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, for example, Benin authorities arrested the defendant
and placed him in custody on June 5, 1998.251 At the time of his arrest, the defendant
happened to be at the residence of Joseph Nzirorera, a former Rwandan government
official accused of organizing atrocities in Rwanda’s Ruhengeri province. The Benin
authorities were attempting to execute an ICTR arrest warrant on Nzizorera. The
authorities presumably did not know who Kajelijeli was -- they did not have a search
warrant for him.252
On September 9, 1998, the defendant, who had been the mayor of Rwanda’s
Mukingo commune (part of the Ruhengeri province) at the time of the 1994 genocide,
was transferred from Benin to the seat of the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania.253 It was not
until approximately five months later, on February 2, 1999, that he was assigned defense
counsel.254 Finally, the defendant initially appeared for arraignment before a Trial
Chamber on April 7, 1999 – roughly seven months after being transferred to the ICTR.255
On November 9, 1998, the defendant filed a motion challenging the legality of his
arrest and detention. In his motion, he contended that the ICTR did not have jurisdiction
over him, in part, because of alleged irregularities in his arrest and detention in Benin.256
In particular, he argued that: (1) he had been arbitrarily arrested and detained; (2) when
he was arrested on June 5, 1998, he was not informed of the reasons for his arrest; (3) he
was detained in Benin for three months without learning the charges against him and
without being charged; and (4) before his transfer to the ICTR, he was handed three
documents, two of which were in language he neither spoke nor understood, and the third
was redacted as to him, so it could not provide him with any notice, let alone adequate
notice, of the charges against him.
In dismissing Kajelijeli’s motion, the Tribunal focused on the fact that it lacked
control over actions carried out by law enforcement officials in Benin:
When the Prosecutor makes a request for the arrest of the
Accused, the matter falls within the domain of the
detained for more than one month because he was not promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest,
Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to review the legal circumstances attending the arrest of the suspect insofar as
the arrest was made pursuant to the laws of the arresting state); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-9844-I, ¶ 35 (May 8, 2000) [hereinafter Kajelijeli Decision]; Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-441 (Dec. 10, 1999) (holding the Tribunal “cannot provide any remedy concerning such arrest and custody as
these are still matters within the jurisdiction of the requested State.”); Prosecutor v. Ngirumpatse, Case No.
ICTR-97-44-1 (Dec. 10, 1999) (concluding “the Tribunal is not competent to supervise the legality of
arrest, custody, search and seizure executed by the requested State. The laws of the requested State may
not require an arrest warrant or impose other legal conditions.”).
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requested State and it is that State which organizes, controls
and carries out the arrest in accordance with their domestic
law. All these procedures were fulfilled in this case . . . the
Trial Chamber therefore, considers that it cannot provide
any remedy concerning such arrest and custody as these are
still matters within the jurisdiction of the requested State . .
. the Tribunal is not competent to supervise the legality of
arrest, custody, search and seizure executed by the
requested State. The laws of the requested State may not
require an arrest warrant or impose other legal
conditions.257
The Kajelijeli case is by no means unique. Perhaps the best known of these cases
is Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza.258 Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was a founding member of
the extremist Hutu-power party Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) and the
infamous Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), often called “Radio
Machete.”259
On April 15, 1996, Barayagwiza, along with a number of other Rwandans, was
arrested in Cameroon pursuant to international arrest warrants issued by Rwanda and
Belgium.260 The next day the ICTR Prosecutor also requested that Barayagwiza be held
pending the Tribunal’s decision as to whether it would request his transfer to the ICTR
seat in Arusha.261 On May 16, 1996, however, the ICTR Prosecutor notified Cameroon
that it was no longer interested in Barayagwiza's transfer.262 On February 17, 1997,
Cameroon denied Rwanda's extradition request and ordered Barayagwiza's release.263 At
the same time, however, the ICTR Prosecutor again asked that Barayagwiza be held and a
week later officially requested his transfer.264 Cameroon promptly issued a transfer order
on March 4, but did not send Barayagwiza to Arusha until November 19, 1997.265
On February 23, 1998, he pleaded not guilty to all counts lodged against him. The
next day, February 24, 1998, Barayagwiza filed an "extremely urgent motion" that sought

257

Kajelijeli Decision, supra note 250, ¶¶ 34-35.
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision (Nov. 3,
1999) [hereinafter Barayagwiza I]. See also Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-A, Appeals
Chamber Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter
Barayagwiza II].
259
See generally Gregory S. Gordon, “A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations”: The
ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech, 45 VA. J. INT’L L.
139, 140-41 n.2 (2004).
260
Barayagwiza I, supra note 258. See also William A. Schabas, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 94 AM. J.
INT’L L. 563 (2000); Mercedeh Momeni, Why Barayagwiza Is Boycotting His Trial at the ICTR: Lessons in
Balancing Due Process Rights and Politics, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315 (2001).
261
Barayagwiza I, supra note 258.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id.
258

34

to throw out his arrest because, inter alia, he had been illegally detained.266 The ICTR
Trial Chamber denied the motion.267
However, on November 3, 1999, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial
Chamber decision based on “abuse of process” and ordered that Barayagwiza be returned
to Cameroon because the length of his detention had been far beyond what international
human rights standards allow.268 The Appeals Chamber inveighed that “[n]othing less
than the integrity of the Tribunal is at stake in this case. Loss of public confidence in the
Tribunal, as a court valuing human rights of all individuals--including those charged with
unthinkable crimes--would be among the most serious consequences of allowing
[Barayagwiza] to stand trial in the face of such violations of his rights.”269
On November 19, 1999, the Prosecutor notified the Appeals Chamber of her
intention to ask it to review or reconsider its ruling, and she submitted such a motion on
December 1, citing new facts.270 The “new facts” consisted, in part, of a Cameroonian
judge's explanations of the politics of the transfer process from Cameroon to Arusha.271
On March 31, 2000, the Appeals Chamber ruled that because the new facts showed that
“the violations suffered by the [Accused] and the omissions of the Prosecutor are not the
same as those which emerged from the facts on which the [November] Decision is
founded,” the November decision should be “altered.”272 The gravamen of the Appeals
Chamber decision in Barayagwiza II was “the new information [that] the violations of
Barayagwiza’s rights were more due to Cameroon than the Prosecutor . . .”273 In the end,
Cameroon’s falling on the sword had no consequences for Cameroon but entailed a
serious derogation of Barayagwiza’s due process rights.274

266

Id.
See Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision on the Extremely Urgent Motion
by the Defense for Orders to Review and/or Nullify the Arrest and Provisional Detention of the Suspect
(Nov. 17, 1998).
268
Barayagwiza I, supra note 258.
269
Id. ¶ 112.
270
See Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for
Review or Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000).
271
Id. See also Momeni, supra note 260, at 319.
272
Barayagwiza II, supra note 258, at ¶ 74.
273
Sluiter, supra note 4, at 944. It should be pointed out that after Barayagwiza I, Rwanda suspended
cooperation with the ICTR, thereby effectively halting all of the Tribunal's investigations. See Katz Cogan,
supra note 243, at 135. The ICTR Appeals Chamber judges denied that they had been coerced into
changing their decision to release Barayagwiza, but most commentators believe it likely that “Rwanda's
threats played a part in the outcome.” Id. Barayagwiza was eventually tried and convicted of genocide,
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and crimes against
humanity (extermination and persecution). He was sentenced to life imprisonment but, in light of the
procedural violations related to his pre-trial detention, his sentence was reduced to thirty-five years. See
Gordon, supra note 259, at 141.
274
As a remedy for the due process violations, Barayagwiza’s sentence was reduced from life
imprisonment to 35 years. Gordon, supra note 259, at 141 n. 3.
267

35

The ICTY has faced similar issues and arrived at the same result. In Prosecutor
v. Nikolic,275 the defendant, the former commander of the Susica detention camp in
Eastern Bosnia, claimed that his arrest and subsequent detention were unlawful because
he was abducted by unknown individuals from the territory of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (in Serbia) and then placed in the custody of the ICTY’s “special police
force” (SFOR) in Bosnia.276 He claimed he was handcuffed and in the trunk of a car
when handed over to SFOR277 and that SFOR had actual or constructive knowledge of
the abduction.278 In a motion challenging the exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the
defendant requested the remedy of terminating the proceedings.279 The Chamber denied
the motion on the grounds that, inter alia, neither the Tribunal nor SFOR were involved
in, or had actual or constructive knowledge of, the defendant’s abduction.280
3.

Defense Efforts to Collect Evidence

If international criminal prosecutors must surmount sizable obstacles to obtain all
necessary cooperation with States, the defendants they prosecute are truly disadvantaged
in this regard. State reluctance to assist suspected war criminals and genocidaires is
exacerbated by statutory mechanisms permitting States to eschew the cooperation regime.
For example, ICTY Statute Article 29 provides that “States shall cooperate with
the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.”281 Under ICTY RPE
Rule 39, the Prosecutor may summon and question witnesses and may seek the assistance
of any State in doing so.282 Rule 54 permits judges to “issue such orders, summonses,
subpoenas, warrants, and transfer orders as may be necessary for purposes of an
investigation or for the preparation or conduct of trial.”283
Nevertheless, the ICTY RPE help to neuter these provisions by creating loopholes
for national security information (Rule 54 bis) and materials provided to the ICTY on a
confidential basis (Rule 70).284 The same is true of the ICC. Article 86 of the Rome
Statute provides that “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this
Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.” On the other hand, under Article 54.3(e), materials
provided to the Court “on the condition of confidentiality” may not be disclosed.285
Similarly, pursuant to Article 72, a State may refuse to disclose evidence if doing so
275
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would “prejudice its national security interests.”286 The defendant’s inability to collect
such information may also go a long way toward curtailing his due process rights.
The ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Blaskic is illustrative.287 Tihomir Blaskic, a
Bosnian Croat, had been a colonel and then a general in the Croation Defense Council (or
“HVO,” the Bosnian Croat army).288 In the spring of 1993, HVO forces engaged in
ethnic cleansing measures that resulted in the massacre of Muslim civilians in the central
Bosnian Lasva Valley region -- most infamously in the village of Ahmici.289 Blaskic was
the commander of the HVO's Central Bosnia Operative Zone at the time.290 On
November 10, 1995, the ICTY indicted Blaskic (relying on the command responsibility
doctrine) for crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, and violations of the laws or customs of war. Blaskic surrendered himself to the
Tribunal in 1996.291
On January 15, 1997, the ICTY issued subpoenas duces tecum to, inter alia, the
Republic of Croatia, its Defense Minister, as well as to its Custodian of Records of the
Central Archives.292 The subpoenas ordered the State and its officials to produce
documents concerning the military command structures and plans of military actions.293
The matter was brought before Trial Chamber II, which found that ICTY judges had
authority to issue orders, such as subpoenas, to States, high government officials and
individuals.294 Croatia appealed and on October 29, 1997, the Appeals Chamber ruled to
quash the subpoena.295 In doing so, it defined the scope of the ICTY’s judicial reach in
relation to sovereign States. While it held that the ICTY could issue binding orders to
States, 296 it also found that it could not issue binding orders to specific State officials
acting in their official capacity.297 It further held that the ICTY has no enforcement
powers in relation to States.298 Rather, its only recourse is to report such non-compliance
to the Security Council.299 Finally, the Appeals Chamber ruled that States could invoke a
“national security” justification for withholding evidence.300
286
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Blaskic was eventually tried, convicted and sentenced to 45 years’
imprisonment.301 Only a few days later, Croatian authorities announced they had found
documents that may have exonerated him.302 These documents had come to light after
the death of Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, who had opposed disclosing documents
in connection with the Blaskic proceedings.303 On March 17, 2000, Blaskic filed a notice
of appeal and ultimately submitted 8,000 pages of additional evidence to the Appellate
Chamber.304 On July 29, 2004, based in part on the new evidence obtained from Croatia,
the Appeals Chamber reversed 16 of the Trial Chamber’s 19 convictions and reduced
Blaskic’s sentence to nine years’ imprisonment.305 Thus, the Blaskic case perfectly
demonstrates fragmentation’s potential for pernicious effects on due process in the pretrial stage.
4.

Compelling Witness Testimony

In addition to documentary evidence, international defendants may also face
troublesome obstacles in securing the presence of favorable witnesses at trial. Pursuant
to the Rome Statute, for example, “States Parties are under no duty to compel witnesses
to appear in the Hague to testify at trial.”306 Under Rule 93(1)(e) of the Rome Statute, the
duty of States is limited to the facilitation of the voluntary appearance of a person as a
witness.307
Some observers have gone so far as to posit a right of witnesses not to appear
before the ICC.308 Under this provision, a person in custody in the requested State may
be transferred to the ICC only if that person freely consents to the transfer. These
observers argue that if the person’s transfer to the ICC’s custody hinges on that person’s
consent, then, by extrapolation, the same must be true for all other witnesses.309
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Overall, then, international defendants must rely on the kindness of strangers (i.e.
States) for fairness in the way they are searched, seized, detained, notified of the charges
against them, provided with counsel (if at all), transferred to an international court for
arraignment and given access to witnesses, documents and other possible exculpatory
evidence. Such kindness is often lacking and this is an inherent constraint on the
application and growth of due process in international criminal procedure.310
B.

Integration

The second inhibiting factor, “integration,” refers to the efforts of international
criminal procedure to harmonize the differing rules of its member countries into a
cohesive system that will satisfy all concerned. As pointed out earlier, the primary
tension in this regard is between two legal systems: the Anglo-American common law
system versus the civil law system, which predominates in continental Europe. Because
civil law systems place “more limitations on the rights of defendants” than do common
law systems,311compromises made to appease civil law practitioners may result in
constricting the rights of defendants that are cherished as fundamental by common law
jurists.
This phenomenon, as demonstrated previously, certainly played a role in the
diminution of due process rights at Nuremberg. But six decades on, after the blossoming
human rights movement has reached full flower, what fundamental prerogatives have
been dispensed with in deference to continental practice? In contrast to the
“fragmentation” phenomenon (primarily affecting pre-trial matters), the impact of
integration is seen mostly in the trial and post-trial stages. A derogation of rights comes
into focus primarily with respect to three areas: (1) permitting the functional equivalent
of trials in absentia; (2) permitting the admission of evidence through other than live
witness testimony; and (3) exposing defendants to the perils of double jeopardy.
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side, United States standards of procedural due process offer the most protection to an accused athlete.”).
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1.

The Functional Equivalent of Trials in Absentia

Under the ICTY RPE, the first step toward trial is the Prosecutor’s submission of
an indictment for confirmation by a judge.312 After a review hearing and confirmation of
the indictment, a warrant, sent to the relevant States, is issued for the accused’s arrest.313
The Prosecutor may also request, through the ICTY Registrar, that the national
authorities of the relevant States publish the indictment in widely circulated newspapers.

314

In cases where these measures fail to bring about the arrest of the accused, the
Tribunal may resort to Rule 61, which sets out the “Procedure in Case of Failure to
Execute a Warrant.” There are essentially two steps in the Rule 61 procedure. The first
step requires the Prosecutor to satisfy the confirmation judge that the Prosecutor has
taken all reasonable steps to effect personal service. After this begins the second step in
the procedure, known as the Rule 61 hearing. At this stage, the Prosecutor must submit
the indictment and supporting evidence, which may include witness testimony, to the
Trial Chamber in open court.315 If, on the basis of the above evidence “together with
such additional evidence as the Prosecutor may tender,” the Trial Chamber is satisfied
that “there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed all or any
of the crimes charged in the indictment, it shall so determine.”316 In addition, the
Chamber will issue an international arrest warrant for the accused317 and may order a
State to provisionally freeze the accused's assets.318
In his opening statement at the Tribunal’s first Rule 61 hearing against Dragan
Nikolic, Justice Richard Goldstone, the former Prosecutor of the Tribunal, asserted that
such proceedings have important consequences: “The publication of the evidence before
the Tribunal . . . will constitute a permanent judicial record for all time of the horrendous
war crimes that have been committed in the former Yugoslavia. That public record will
assist in attributing guilt to individuals . . .”319
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In light of this rationale for Rule 61 hearings, they have been “characterized as the
functional equivalent of trials.”320 In this sense, Rule 61 “protects the interests of the civil
law countries [in trials in absentia] because a civil law inquisitorial method was adopted
in the procedure which allows a Trial Chamber at the ICTY to examine and question
witnesses and pronounce whether there is reason to believe the suspect committed the
crimes specified in the indictment.”321 According to Professor William Schabas, “They
[Rule 61 proceedings] really were in absentia trials, the only meaningful distinction
being they didn’t impose a sentence when it was over.”322
As a result, “many believe [this form of trial in absentia] does not comport with
the norms of due process under the international human rights regime.”323 Of the laundry
list of due process violations defendant’s absence entails, perhaps the most egregious is
the inability to cross-examine witnesses.324 Less obvious, perhaps, is the proceeding’s
standard of proof. At the end of the hearing, as noted above, the judges state whether
there are mere “reasonable grounds” to believe the accused has committed the acts
charged in the indictment.325 This finding has been described as “a determination of
guilt.”326 Thus, “reasonable grounds” is certainly an anemic standard of proof in contrast
to the robust “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard prevailing in customary rightsprotective criminal adjudications.327
Regrettably, the potential for such pre-trial kangaroo courts exists at the ICC as
well. As explained previously, Article 61(2) of the ICC RPE allows the Pre-Trial
Chamber to conduct confirmation hearings in the absence of the person charged.328 This
occurs when it is not possible to find the person charged in spite of reasonable steps taken
320

Mark Thieroff & Edward A. Amley, Jr., Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans:
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 231, 234
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to secure his appearance.329 As with the ICTY RPE, this confirmation hearing in
absentia was a concession to those delegations at the Rome conference that had
unsuccessfully argued in favor of trials in absentia.330 One commentator has observed:
“These confirmation hearings bear a certain resemblance to the Rule 61 proceedings
before the ICTY.”331 As such, from a due process perspective, they are equally deficient.
2.

Trial by Transcript

As revealed by the Nuremberg experience, the civil law inquisitorial system has
no qualms about admitting the testimony of witnesses through sworn affidavits,
transcripts or other written means, as opposed to live in-court testimony.332 In its current
form, international criminal procedure is influenced by the same policy. In fact, “the
precedent available . . . from the ICTY allows for testimony via affidavit in what is at
best a very weak cross-examination guarantee for the accused.”333
In particular, ICTY RPE Rule 92 bis (adopted in 2000)334 is designed to provide a
mechanism for submitting evidence in writing that concerns matters more peripheral to
the crimes charged, such as the background of the conflict, statistical analysis, the
character of the accused and sentencing matters.335 In the first case to address the
application of Rule 92 bis, the Trial Chamber noted that the rule’s intent, consistent with
civil law objectives, was “to try and cut down the length of these trials . . . [A] large
amount of time in this Tribunal has been taken up with pointless and repetitive crossexamination, and this Rule is aimed at dealing with it.” Thus, the rule “clearly evinces
the trend towards broader resort to the admission of written evidence.”336 Professor
Zappalà has noted the deleterious effects this trend may have on due process:
Affidavits are in principle less trustworthy than depositions
because they are taken ex parte, without any chance of
cross-examination. Moreover, they present the same
drawbacks as hearsay evidence, since they are out-of-court
329
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statements presented at trial . . . When affidavits are
submitted, defendants are clearly not confronted with the
source of the evidence. Additionally, affidavits lack those
elements of orality and direct examination that should
characterize the presentation of evidence in adversarial
trials.337
The due process mischief sanctioned by ICTY Rule 92 bis was on display in
Prosecutor v. Sikirica,338 where the Trial Chamber admitted into evidence, inter alia, two
witness statements relating to arguably central issues in the Prosecutor’s case.339 The
Trial Chamber acknowledged that one of these statements was capable of “[constituting]
a means of proof of an element of the genocide charge against the accused . . .”340 And it
characterized the other as “capable of going towards the proof of the crime of genocide
with which Mr. Sikirica is charged.”341 As a result, the defense sought to cross-examine
these witnesses with respect to the full scope of their previous testimony.342 However,
the Trial Chamber permitted only limited cross-examination. With respect to one of the
statements, the Chamber held:
The fact that a witness’s account is alleged to be one-sided
is a matter which can be dealt with by comments in final
submissions or the calling of evidence. The way to deal
with new evidence alleged, to contradict the witness’s
evidence, is to call the new evidence.343
Thus, rather than permit the defense to challenge the witness directly and test his
credibility viva voce with respect to bias and “new evidence,” the Trial Chamber allowed
Rule 92 bis to infringe on the defendant’s confrontation rights.
In the case of Prosecutor v. Galic, the Trial Chamber allowed into evidence,
pursuant to Rule 92 bis (C), the statements of two witnesses, since deceased.344 In
granting an interlocutory appeal with respect to one of the statements, the Appeals
337
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Chamber observed that parties may use Rule 92 bis statements to establish the acts and
conduct of others (i.e., not the accused).345 Parties may then marshal such evidence to
establish the state of mind of the accused.346 The Appeals Chamber provided the
following example of the latter: “An easy example would be proof, in relation to Article 5
of the Tribunal's Statute, of the knowledge by the accused that his acts fitted into a
pattern of widespread or systematic attacks directed against a civilian population.”347
According to one commentator:
That these interpretations of the Rule are a far cry from its
‘original purpose’ is evident. It is further worth noting,
however, that the admission of such statements without
cross-examination, as the decision suggests, and as the Rule
allows, runs contrary even to the precedent established at
Nuremberg. [A cause for concern] is the nearly limitless
discretion conferred upon the Trial Chambers in the
employment of the Rule. Inherent in this enhanced
discretion is the fact that determinations made by a Trial
Chamber would likely only be reversed if the decision at
issue evidences a clear abuse of discretion, a fact that
conceivably may not bode well vis-à-vis the fair trial rights
of the accused.348
ICC criminal procedure may be subject to the same vice. Rome Statute Article
69(2) permits previously recorded testimony, documents and transcripts (subject to the
RPE) as evidence at trial.349 With respect to recorded testimony, Rule 68(a) of the ICC
RPE requires that the Prosecutor and the defense have the opportunity to examine the
witness during the recording.350 Nevertheless, “it will be for the judges to develop more
specific criteria to give proper weight to the general principle, laid down in Article 69(2),
that witnesses shall testify before the Court in person.”351
3.

Double Jeopardy

The integration of common and civil law circumscribes yet another fundamental
right of international criminal defendants: the protection against double jeopardy. The
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

345

Id. ¶ 11
Id.
347
Id. See also Daryl A. Mundis, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals, 1 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 197, 218 (2003).
348
Fairlie, supra note 334, at 78-79.
349
Rome Statute, supra note 154, art. 69(2). See Kress, supra note 182, at 611. Still, Article 69(2)
mandates that such admission not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused. Rome
Statute, supra note 154, art. 69(2).
350
ICC RPE, supra note 155, R. 68(a).
351
Kress, supra note 182, at 611.
346

44

protects persons from being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 352 While, as
noted earlier, defendants in both the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC have a right not to be
placed in double jeopardy,353 that right is couched in the civil law protection of “non bis
in idem” which roughly translates from Latin into: “Not twice for the same thing.”354
Although double jeopardy and “non bis in idem” are roughly comparable,355 there is one
significant due process difference, as explained by Professor Sean Murphy:
The principle of non bis in idem is similar to, but different
from, the prohibition on “double jeopardy” in common law
countries. Non bis in idem addresses the possibility of
repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in different
legal systems, whereas double jeopardy generally refers to
repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in the same
legal system.356
As a result, in contrast with the common law practice, non bis in idem permits the
prosecutor to appeal an acquittal for errors of law and questions of fact.357 In France’s
civil law system, for example, the parties in a criminal case may appeal a conviction, an
acquittal, a dismissal or a sentence.358 Moreover, on appeal a reviewing court may
reverse and remand the case, or revise the judgment.359 Both prosecutorial challenge and
appellate review of acquittals are anathema to common law notions of the double
jeopardy protection.360
352
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The due process implications of this procedural wedge between common and civil
law are on display in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda.361 In that case, the ICTR Trial Chamber
acquitted Georges Rutaganda, a prominent Hutu businessman and former second vice
president (youth wing) of a Hutu extremist militia (the “Interahamwe”), of war crimes
(violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II
thereto) for his alleged role in directing attacks against Tutsis at the École Technique
Officiel (ETO School) and the Nyanza gravel pit in the Kigali area.362 The Trial
Chamber held that the prosecution failed to establish the required nexus between
Rutaganda’s criminal acts and the armed conflict.363 The prosecution challenged this
factual finding on appeal and the Appeals Chamber reversed.364
Because the Trial Chamber had made factual findings recognizing a link between
the ETO school and Nyanza massacres and the armed conflict, and had determined that
Rutaganda had participated in these attacks, the Appeals Chamber concluded that no
reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that there
existed a nexus between Rutaganda’s participation in the killings at the ETO School and
the armed conflict.365 Since the Trial Chamber's erroneous conclusion that a nexus had
not been established was the only basis for its acquittal of Rutaganda on the two counts
of war crimes, the Appeals Chamber convicted him on those counts.366
To common law ears, the strange cluster of the words “the Appeals Chamber
convicted him” sounds blasphemous. It signifies that the prosecution received a second
bite at the apple. 367 From a fairness perspective, a prosecutor’s right to appeal acquittals
is “not necessarily appropriate in international criminal proceedings.”368 Yet it is another
due process casualty that results from forcing the square peg of the common law system
into the round hole of the civil law system.
C.

Gravity

International criminal law deals with the most horrific, large-scale crimes human
(1957). The Court went on to articulate the policy behind the double jeopardy ban: “(T)hat the State with
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beings can commit. The horror of these crimes, as well as the intense suffering they visit
on victims, have to some degree put the human rights movement on the horns of a
dilemma: vindicate the due process rights of the accused or adequately punish the
perpetrator? Professor Paul Dubinsky sees a normative priority evolution from the
former to the latter: “A new subfield – call it “atrocity law” – [has] exerted increasing
influence on the human rights movement as a whole, creating a shift in emphasis from
procedural due process to holding perpetrators accountable and providing remedies to
victims.”369 As demonstrated above, the magnitude of the horror adjudged at Nuremberg
likely played a part in limiting the due process protections afforded to defendants in that
proceeding.370
The same consideration exerts a limiting force with respect to certain procedural
protections offered to international criminal defendants today. This portion of the Article
will focus on three areas where this has been an issue: (1) pre-trial detention and
provisional release; (2) witnesses protection and victims’ rights; and (3) the right to trial
by jury.
1.

Pre-Trial Detention

The general practice in the ad hoc Tribunals reveals that once the indictment is
confirmed, the defendants are normally held in pre-trial detention.371 Pursuant to
consistent Tribunal practice, the judge confirming the indictment also issues one or more
arrest warrants addressed to relevant State authorities requesting the arrest and transfer of
the accused.372 The indicted person should then be arrested and transferred to the custody
of the Tribunal.373 Thereafter, the accused is detained at the UN Detention facility (either
in the Hague or Arusha) and may be released only under the conditions set out in Rule 65
of the RPEs for both Tribunals.374
At this stage, an essential pre-trial prerogative for criminal defendants “is the right
to apply for provisional or interim release.”375 In fact, a policy for provisional release is a
“natural outgrowth of the presumption of innocence.”376 For to presume that an accused
is innocent means, among other things, that punishment cannot begin until an accused is
convicted.377 As a result:
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[D]etention must serve some other distinguishable goal.
Unless the prosecution can show strong countervailing
interests such as danger to victims or witnesses or a risk of
flight, the accused must be temporarily released pending
trial. The argument for temporary release is at its strongest
when the accused faces a long period of detention before
the court decides his guilt or innocence.378
Nevertheless, in contravention of the presumption of innocence, Rule 65 of the ad
hoc Tribunals’ RPEs (governing pre-trial release) was for many years extremely
restrictive and placed on the accused the burden of showing “exceptional circumstances”
to justify release.379 Under this rule, provisional release was granted “only in very rare
cases in which the condition of the accused, notably the accused’s state of health, is not
compatible with any form of detention.”380
Although Rule 65 of each RPE has been amended to remove the “exceptional
circumstances” requirement,381 the burden is still on the accused to prove that he will
appear for trial and not pose a danger to any victim, witness, or other person.382
Moreover, both the Statutes and RPEs of the Tribunals “lack clear and precise criteria
with regard to the application of the concrete possibility of release on bail.”383 As a
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result, “it still remains true that liberty is the exception while detention is the rule”384 and,
for the most part, “post-amendment, provisional-release practices operate in exactly the
same manner.”385
Nor can one be sanguine about the prospect of a more progressive provisional
release regime for the ICC. The Rome Statute allows the accused to apply for provisional
release in two situations: (1) to the competent authorities in the custodial State pending
surrender proceedings, while being detained in that State (pursuant to Article 59(3))386;
and (2) to the ICC once the accused is detained in the Hague pending trial (pursuant to
Articles 60 (1), (2)).387 In the case of the custodial State, authorities may only allow
provisional release when justified by “urgent and exceptional circumstances” and in the
presence of sufficient safeguards to ensure its ICC surrender obligations.388 Once in ICC
custody, the Pre-Trial Chamber may grant provisional release only if it is not satisfied
that the following conditions are met: (1) no reasonable grounds exist for believing that
the accused has committed the particular crime; or (2) his arrest appears no longer
necessary (i.e., to ensure appearance at trial or to prevent obstruction of the investigation
and trial).389
Unfortunately, similar to the ad hoc Tribunals and contrary to Article 9(3) of the
ICCPR, both forms of ICC provisional release are framed on the presumption in favor of
detention.390 This means that “both the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC endorse a
provisional release standard that deviates from human rights law.”391 According to one
commentator: “The only justification for this stringency that comes to mind is the gravity
of the offenses over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction and the desire to avoid a public
outcry over allowing accused persons to be at large.”392
2.

Witness Protection and Victim Rights

There is an ineluctable tension in certain phases of war crimes prosecutions
between upholding the due process rights of the accused and assuring the safety and
dignity of witnesses to unspeakable horrors. Not surprisingly, that tension often resolves
itself in favor of the victims/witnesses. At the same time, in the eyes of many, the
awesome gravity of the crime transforms the juridical status of the victim from mere
bystander to party opponent. Investing the victim with such procedural stature and access
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may improperly tilt the scales of justice overwhelmingly in favor of the prosecution.
This section will explore how that could happen.
a.

Witness Anonymity and Due Process

The proceedings in a witness protection motion in the case of Prosecutor v.
Tadic read somewhat like a legal morality play pitting the value of safeguarding a
defendant’s rights against the necessity to shield vulnerable witnesses. Dusko Tadic, an
ethnic Serb from Bosnia-Herzegovina, was arrested in Germany in early 1994 and
charged by German authorities with crimes committed in the Omarska prison camp
during the spring of 1992. Pursuant to a request by the ICTY, Germany transferred
custody of Tadic to the ICTY in April 1995. 394
393

The ICTY indicted Tadic on 132 counts of crimes against humanity and war
crimes.
These crimes included “forcible sexual intercourse or rape, willful killing or
murder, willfully causing grave suffering or serious injury, torture, cruel treatment and
the commission of inhumane acts . . .”396
395

As the prosecution prepared its case against Tadic, it realized that several
traumatized witnesses were unwilling to testify in open court.397 As a result, on May 18,
1995, the prosecution filed its Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and
Witnesses. 398 Out of fourteen prayers for relief, two requested complete witness
anonymity.399 Of those, one requested “that testimony of . . . witnesses may be given
using voice and image altering devices or by not transmitting the image of the accused to
the defense.”400 The other requested that, inter alia, the “prosecution may withhold from
the defense and the accused the names of, and other identifying data concerning
witnesses G, H, I, J, and K.”401
In a controversial 2-1 decision, the Trial Chamber granted the motion. It began
by acknowledging that witness anonymity is an extraordinary measure in traditional
domestic criminal trials and that it could be a barrier to accurate fact-finding.402 In
addition, Article 21 of the ICTY Statute gave Tadic the right “to examine, or have
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examined, the witnesses against him” and to receive “a fair and public hearing.”403 The
Trial Chamber pointed out, however, that Article 21 is expressly subject to Article 22,404
which provides for witness protection including “the conduct of in camera proceedings
and the protection of the victim’s identity.”405
The Trial Chamber then acknowledged that courts interpreting international
instruments phrased similarly to Article 21 have uniformly rejected witness anonymity
protective measures in criminal cases.406 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber distinguished
those cases on both factual and legal grounds. Factually, it noted that, in contrast to the
cases cited, the Tribunal had a particular dependence on eyewitness testimony407 in a
climate of “terror and anguish among the civilian population.”408 Legally, the Trial
Chamber distinguished the cases on the basis of the Statute’s “unique legal framework,”
which provides specially for the protection of victims and witnesses.409 Then, most
importantly for the analysis here, the Chamber found that standards applicable to
“ordinary criminal and ... civil adjudications” were not appropriate for the “horrific”
crimes and then-ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia.410
Thus, the extraordinary nature of the crimes at issue was a factor in adopting
measures that circumscribed Tadic’s right to a fair trial. Judge Ninian Stephen of
Australia dissented, however, writing that complete witness anonymity simply went too
far.411 He indicated that anonymity offended notions of due process by depriving the
defense of its ability to demonstrate that a witness’s testimony could be prejudiced,
hostile or unreliable.412 And he deplored the potential conviction of a man on such
serious charges through the use of evidence appearing as nothing more than a
“disembodied and distorted voice transmitted by electronic means.”413 Given the stakes,
he concluded, the use of unqualified immunity is not authorized by the Statute insofar as
it does not comport with the Article 21(4) “minimum guarantee” of the rights of the
accused.414
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Since Tadic, the ICTY has not granted the extreme remedy of complete witness
anonymity.415 Nevertheless, one cannot say that the remedy is a “dead letter”416 and the
specter of anonymity measures hangs over every war crimes prosecution, “given the
unusual dangers” faced by witnesses and the “limited ability” to protect them.417 As a
result, “the potential for allowing anonymity from the accused . . . represents a potential
danger in future adjudication.”418
b.

Victims’ Rights

The future of international criminal justice is poised to alter the juridical status of
atrocity victims. The ICC’s Rome Statute gives victims of humanity’s most serious
crimes a much more significant role than has any previous international criminal
institution.419 In fact, unlike the ad hoc Tribunals, victims actually have standing in their
own right at the ICC. According to the Rome Statute, the ICC must “permit their
[victims’] views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings
determined to be appropriate by the Court.”420 Victims have a right to be heard, as well as
to speak: the prosecutor and judges must consider victims' interests in making a range of
decisions, including whether to initiate an investigation into particular allegations421 and
whether to bring charges.422
In a recently published decision, the ICC held in its case regarding the Situation in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that victims may participate at the earliest
stages of an investigation. In Decision on the Applications for Participation in the
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6,423 the victims,
who allegedly suffered human rights abuses at the hands of various uncharged
415
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perpetrators in the DRC, argued that pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute they
should be permitted to present to the Chamber their “views and concerns” regarding the
investigation.424 The Prosecutor opposed the application on, inter alia, the following
grounds: (1) at that stage there were no “proceedings” within the meaning of article 68(3)
of the Statute because the word “proceedings” does not encompass the investigation of a
“situation”; and (2) the participation of the victims at such a preliminary stage would be
“inappropriate.”425 The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected this argument:
The interpretation of article 68(3) as being applicable to the
investigation stage is . . . consistent with the object and
purpose of the victims participation regime established by
the drafters of the Statue, which ensued from a debate that
took place in the context of the growing emphasis placed
on the role of victims by the international body of human
rights law and by international humanitarian law. . . In the
Chamber's opinion, the Statute grants victims an
independent voice and role in proceedings before the Court.
It should be possible to exercise this independence, in
particular, vis-à-vis the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court so that victims can present their interests.
As the European Court has affirmed on several occasions,
victims participating in criminal proceedings cannot be
regarded as "either the opponent - or for that matter
necessarily the ally - of the prosecution, their roles and
objectives being clearly different.426
In fact, this unique role carved out for victims will have an impact through the
entire course of ICC proceedings. What is perhaps the Rome Statute’s most innovative
provision allows the court to reject a plea bargain or request the presentation of evidence
against a defendant who has already pled guilty if “a more complete presentation of the
facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the
victims.”427
Such victim empowerment essentially reconfigures the structure of international
criminal justice.428 Although in principle the enumerated victim rights must be exercised
424
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without prejudice to those of the accused, it is difficult to reconcile this with the
extraordinary influence victims may exert over the process.429 They are suddenly
endowed with juridical life and can function as juridical actors with a built-in axe to
grind.430 The prospect of an ICC judge soliciting the views of a quasi-party to the
litigation, who has been brutalized, disfigured, and dispossessed, could understandably
send shudders down the collective spine of the international criminal defense bar.
Respect for the rights of defendants requires a neutral, dispassionate setting in
which relatively neutral, dispassionate actors go about their business. Such critical
decisions as initiating an investigation into particular allegations, bringing certain
charges, or rejecting a plea bargain, traditionally the province of prosecutors and judges
assumed to be examining the evidence without any untoward motive or bias, may now be
affected by the moving cries of the fallen. And due process may suffer as a result. As
one commentator points out:
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When the rights of victims and the accused seemingly
conflict, we risk the abrogation of important due process
rights as their distinction collapses into larger notions of
justice and fairness . . . While fairness rightly involves the
simultaneous considerations of victims and accused in
regard to allegations of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, the Tribunals will be wise to isolate the
important procedural protections for the rights of the
accused and to prioritize those interests as paramount.431
Melding this “ICC victims’ bill of rights” into critical procedural stages of its
criminal litigation schema, the Rome Statute may adulterate, and ultimately dilute, basic
structural due process protections of ICC defendants. According to Alison Marston
Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, the “victim-oriented, civil law model of human rights”
leads to inordinate [c]oncern for symbolic vindication of violations of victims’ human
rights” and “has proven a more potent influence than worries over potential violations of
defendants’ rights.”432
3.

The Right to Jury Trials

Genocide has been called the “crime of crimes.”433 In terms of societal
opprobrium, crimes against humanity and war crimes feature prominently at the top of
the list as well.434 These crimes saddle international criminal justice with a tremendous
burden “because of a perceived duty to convict large numbers of individuals culpable in
widespread outbreaks of extraordinary evil.”435 Put differently, “the extreme character of
the crimes alleged before international criminal courts makes the case for accountability
stronger than in domestic prosecutions.”436 From this premise, John Haberstroh
concludes:
Ultimately, then, war crime trials and their standards are for
‘the Hitlers, the Goerings, the Pol Pots, the Milosevics, the
Karadzics, and other architects of genocide . . .’ Perhaps
these trials should not be for ‘ordinary murderers,’ as their
multitudes of purposes may take precedence over the
dispensation of justice for matters of less-than431
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extraordinary evil. Perhaps this also helps to explain why
their standards diverge from the practice in U.S. criminal
courts . . .437
Among the more conspicuous divergences is the lack of jury trials.438 That the
architects of our international criminal justice institutions opted for bench trials to
adjudicate liability is perhaps understandable in the mass atrocity context. Right or
wrong, there has been an international perception that jurors are unqualified to sit as
finders of fact given the complexities of modern international criminal law and the
expertise required for forensic fact-finding.439 Moreover, there is a fear that jurors will
be more likely to vote according to their personal biases and popular sentiment than as
trained professionals.440
If jurors were impaneled for genocide and war crimes trials, these tendencies
might very well lead to jury nullification (going either way – unjust conviction or
acquittal) and the international community has found this prospect unacceptable.441
According to former U.S. Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer,
one of those architects just mentioned:
But, when you really think about it, you probably do not
want a jury of twelve peers from all parts of the world to sit
in judgment of your defendant in this court for these types
of crimes. You want very expert judges who know the law,
and who can understand the complexities of atrocity law,442
to be the judges of your innocence or guilt for these
particular crimes.443
437
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Still, as Ambassador Scheffer himself implicitly acknowledges,444 the absence of
the jury feature stands out like a due process sore thumb to most common law attorneys.
For them, it is the bulls-eye on the back of international criminal procedure and they lob
their verbal grenades at it with glee.445
D.

The Relationship Among the Limiting Forces

Although this Article has treated the phenomena of fragmentation, integration,
and gravity as separate and discrete concepts, they are to some degree fluid and often
overlap with one another. Moreover, consistent with this, the due process protections
they limit can typically be analyzed through the prism of more than one of them at a time.
Take the right to jury trials, for example. The analysis above considered the
absence of jury trials in international criminal courts as a function of the exceptional
severity of the crime. While gravity may be a prominent limiting factor, it is certainly not
the only one. Integration plays a part as well since, in civil law countries, most cases are
decided primarily by judges.446 Juries are used only for trying very serious crimes such
as treason, murder, or kidnapping.447 And even in those cases, lay people sit together
with professional judges.448 In fact, these countries use the term “jury” to “describe what
is, in reality, a mixed panel of professional judges and lay people, who deliberate
together.”449
Similarly, fragmentation can be seen as a limiting factor with respect to the jury
trial right. In particular, an international jury of the defendant’s “peers” would create the
appearance of justice imposed from the outside, consisting of “world citizens” with no
understanding of the relevant community experience or ethos.450 Further, the exorbitant
cost, logistical hurdles, and political complications of selecting jurors from all over the
world and bringing them to the Hague means that using an international jury would be
exceptionally difficult, if not practically impossible.451
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And so it goes with the other due process protections. Those rights affected by
fragmentation – for example, protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, as
well as arrest and detention – are equally impacted by the gravity phenomenon. Thus, as
pointed out previously with respect to search and seizure, States may “ignore the privacy
interests of suspects or accused persons . . . in the perceived greater interest of . . .
eradicating impunity for heinous crimes . . .”452 Similarly, “integration” may affect
defense efforts to collect evidence. As noted in connection with the Nuremberg
experience, civil law defense attorneys are accustomed to a magistrate spearheading
investigative efforts and often do not grasp the importance of conducting their own
investigations.453
The rights constricted by “integration” are also impacted by gravity
considerations. Use of documentary evidence at trial, as opposed to live testimony, can
be perceived, at least in part, as protecting the interests of traumatized victim-witnesses
unwilling to relive the terror of these depraved crimes in open court. With respect to
double jeopardy, the fear of letting a genocidaire walk must certainly factor into the
world community’s decision to hedge its bets and provide for prosecutorial appeals. The
same might be said for the quasi-trial in absentia provided for by the drafters of ICTY
Rule 61 – better to expose the infamy of war criminals on the lam, they undoubtedly
reckoned, than to keep their nefarious deeds hidden from public view.454 Fragmentation
plays a role here as well – many of those war criminals evade capture with the help of
States and the Rule 61 hearing helps portray them to the world as accessories after the
fact.
Finally, the rights above that were described as impacted by “gravity” are also
subject to the other restricting forces. The overwhelming preference for pretrial
detention, for example, while certainly affected by the heinousness of the crimes
committed, is also a function of fragmentation. Given a global setting, with
geographically dispersed perpetrators, victims, crime scenes, police forces, prison
facilities, and courthouses, the international criminal defendant clearly poses a greater
flight risk than his homebound domestic counterpart.
By the same token, the rights accorded to victims in the ICC setting are not the
mere product of “gravity.” Victims of crimes in continental Europe have stronger rights
to enforce, and take part in, criminal law proceedings than victims in the United States.455
In addition to the victim’s right in the civil law tradition to attach her tort suit to a
criminal prosecution, many civil law countries accord victims the right to prosecute
certain types of crimes if the prosecutor fails to do so.456 Thus, the “integration”
phenomenon is also responsible for broadening the victim’s role at the expense of the
defendant’s due process rights.
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IV.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A TRULY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

So we have reached a crossroads. The growth of international criminal procedure
has seen attendant, even structurally intertwined, growth in the due process rights of
defendants. But the fully developed national models, to which international due process
seems to aspire, are fundamentally different. They do not have the unenviable task of
harnessing the law enforcement cooperation and resources of free-agent sovereigns,
fusing together the components of two often-mismatched legal systems, and bringing to
justice the law’s most depraved monsters. These are the challenges of international
criminal institutions and, as this Article has demonstrated, they have, in some respects,
helped retard the further development of due process. But is this irreversible?
The indications are that it is not. Rather than calcify, the process would appear to
be fluid and dynamic. And the history of the human rights movement itself helps to
explain why. As Professor Dubinsky suggested earlier, the human rights movement has
evolved in its treatment of criminal matters.457 After being initially focused on atrocity
prosecution issues (as evidenced by Nuremberg, the Genocide Convention, and the
Geneva Conventions), it turned its attention to the process by which prosecution is
achieved. It sought to ensure fairness for the individual swallowed up by the imposing
machinery of criminal adjudication and pitted against the limitless resources of the
State.458 And so followed the UDHR, the ICCPR and a host of other instruments, both
international and regional, designed to safeguard civil, political and judicial rights.
But with the fall of the Iron Curtain and a new worldwide surge of irredentist and
ethnic violence, the pendulum began to swing the other way. Atrocity prosecution was
again at the fore but this time it reflected the due process advances made during that
dormant period between Nuremberg and the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals. By
now, the latter have been in operation for over ten years and are slated to terminate
operations by this decade’s end. Although the ICC is just getting under way, the massive
energy and resources devoted to atrocity prosecution in the 1990s has begun to peter
out.459 A new phrase, “tribunal fatigue,” has been coined460 and it certainly seems as if
the pendulum could be swinging back again toward the reform of procedural
mechanisms. As this most recent burst of prosecutorial activity comes to an end, the
world might well reflect, as it did after Nuremberg and Tokyo, on how it could improve
the way it brings genocidaires and war criminals to justice.
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What might this entail? It would be tempting just to politically cherry-pick due
process features from national jurisdictions, currently lacking at the ad hoc Tribunals and
the ICC, and simply graft them onto the international mold. But that would not be
realistic. The limiting forces analyzed in this Article, while not necessarily intractable,
cannot simply be ignored. Fragmentation will not go away overnight. Integration is a
gradual metamorphosis. And gravity is immutable.
Professor Safferling might have laid out the most realistic road map. And to use it
will require a paradigm shift. Instead of trying to model themselves on national systems,
international criminal procedure will have to forge its own identity. “[T]he aim must be a
truly international criminal procedure which should not be used as a test for the
credibility of domestic penal systems, but stands solidly on the various traditions of
criminal procedure.”461
To perceive fragmentation, integration, and gravity as insurmountable obstacles to
the achievement of this goal may be unduly pessimistic. The twentieth century saw the
birth of the United Nations, an international police force (Interpol), and political, military
and economic regional integration on an unprecedented scale.462 If the twenty-first
century is to replicate the pace of these unifying trends, uniform law enforcement
procedure across national frontiers, and with it the gradual demise of fragmentation, may
not be that far off. According to Professor Dianne Marie Amann, that part of the
paradigm shift is well under way:
Traditionally, how a state chose to fight crime was an
internal matter. States developed their own methods to
investigate crimes, to capture and try suspects, and to
punish criminals. That changed in the last half-century.
Crime became global, spurring law enforcement officers in
461
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individual states to join together in an international attack
on crime.463
Similarly, a Procrustean melding of the civil and common law traditions will not
nullify integration as a limiting force.464 Instead, with due process as its policy lodestar,
international criminal procedure must judiciously mix and match the best features that
each system has to offer.465
The jury trial right comes to mind here. Perhaps the solution is not simply to
impose the Anglo-American jury procedure wholesale onto the international criminal trial
template. Instead, a mixed panel of professional judges and lay jurors could be used.
The Continental system avails itself of this procedure for limited crimes.466 The ICC
could use it for all trials. This might ease the logistical burden by limiting the requisite
size of jury pools. At the same time, it would go far toward insulating the fact-finders
from perceptions of ignorance and bias, on one hand, and extreme intellectual detachment
on the other.
Defense access to evidence might be treated in a similar manner. In the
international setting, a predominately adversarial model invests the prosecution with a
significant resource advantage over the defense and provides institutional channels of
communication with governments, typically not available to the defense, that
significantly facilitate collection of evidence.467 On the other hand, reliance on the
inquisitorial model, which designates a juge d’instruction to conduct investigations, could
result in relatively lackadaisical inquiries.468 A hybrid procedure might employ a
specially designated pre-trial judge to participate in or oversee the collection of evidence.
This would promote “equality of arms” by helping to facilitate defense collection of
evidence abroad and insure prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence. The ICC
system, seeking to expand defendants’ due process rights, already involves a certain
degree of judicial pre-trial oversight of the prosecutor. A hybrid system extending that
oversight to the collection of evidence would further level the playing field while
preserving the inherent assiduousness of prosecutorial investigation.
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In the end, reform through further hybridization, as opposed to political
concession, will create a distinctively unique institution, less torn by allegiance to one or
the other system and more responsive to the special needs of transnational criminal
practice.469 Professor Bassiouni believes that this process of hybridization, reflected in
the evolution of an underlying adversarial model in both national and international
settings, is already well under way:
Contemporaneously, another process of harmonization, or
at least of rapprochement in the standards of “due process”
developed at the national levels as evidenced by the laws
and jurisprudence of the world’s criminal justice systems
and by the judges who interpret and command respect for
the norms shared by various states. The convergence of
these developments gave rise to general principles of law
on the subject of “international due process” which the
ICTY, ICTR and ICC have recognized and applied in their
statutes and in the respective jurisprudence of the ICTY
and ICTR.470
Finally, although the perception of genocide and war crimes may never change,
the way that perception affects their prosecution might. In this age of the Internet and the
global village, the world community may eventually become inured to prosecuting crimes
that are monstrous on a world scale.
In the United States, for example, first-degree murderers get a fair shake at every
stage of criminal proceedings.471 If anything, in capital cases the system bends over
backwards to extend every due process consideration possible.472 This happens not
because society is any less revolted by the sheer evil of such crimes. It happens because,
over time, institutional lynch-mob passions abate and society is allowed to appreciate the
oft-stated maxim that it is better for ten people to go free than for one innocent person to
go to prison.473 Anesthetizing the world to the process of handling genocide may instill it
with the same appreciation.
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And proactive efforts to educate the public about the importance of due process in
mass atrocity prosecution ought to hasten this process. To some extent, prosecution and
legal reform already help serve this role.474 As noted by Shelby Quast, the Director
General of the International Legal Assistance Consortium: “In the international legal
community, we hope we can learn a little more each time we are called to assist a postconflict society in addressing rule of law and begin to build an evolving catalog of best
practices to be implemented in the field.”475 But such efforts must also include assiduous
educational programs. Quast concludes that:
Even the best laws cannot make a difference if they cannot
be implemented. Law reform must often be accompanied
by education that addresses the needs of society to
understand, adopt, and implement such reforms.476
Of course, any such reform through education must be directed not only to victim
societies, but to society at large. For the latter will help investigate the crimes, apprehend
the suspects, furnish the administrative and human resources, and dispense the justice.
The international community must be wary, however, that any such outreach efforts
result in callous attitudes toward mass atrocity. Instead, any such program should seek to
instill sensitization through promotion of human rights values at every stage of social and
legal transition. In the prescient words of Justice Murphy dissenting fifty years ago in the
Yamashita case477:
The immutable rights of the individual . . . belong not alone to the members of
those nations that excel on the battlefield or that subscribe to the democratic
ideology. They belong to every person in the world, victor or vanquished,
whatever may be his race, color, or beliefs . . . No exception is made as to those
who are accused of war crimes or as to those who possess the status of enemy
belligerent. Indeed, such an exception would be contrary to the whole philosophy
of human rights. . .478
...
An uncurbed spirit of revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal procedure
for purposes of dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can do more lasting
harm than all of the atrocities giving rise to that spirit. The people’s faith in the
fairness and objectiveness of the law can be seriously undercut by that spirit.479
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